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The Development and Incorporation
of International Norms in the Formation of
Copyright Law
GRAEME B. DINwooDIE*
The means by which international norms are developed and incorporated in the
formation of copyright law have changed dramatically in recent years. In this
article, Professor Dinwoodie explores the nature of those changes. The classical
model of international copyright law afforded countries significant latitude to
implement international standards in ways tailored to their own economic and
cultural priorities. The lack of an effective method of enforcing international
standards consolidated that deference to national autonomy. And international
treaties tended merely to codify existing commonly accepted national standards.
This model has undergone changes of late, most notably (but not exclusively) in the
context of the TPJPS Agreement, which subsumed the principal international
copyright obligations within the WTO Dispute Settlement system. This change to
the classical model is potentially significant in many ways. Most directly, failure to
fufill international copyright obligations may be met by the imposition of trade
sanctions. More broadly, however, the interpretation of international copyright
obligations by WTO panels may alter the degree of national autonomy afforded
member states and may make international copyright law more forward looking in
nature. International copyright lawmaking by activist WTO panels thus may
generate costs as well as gains. Professor Dinwoodie considers these issues
through an analysis of the first (and, thus far, the only) report of a WITO dispute
settlement panel regarding violation of a copyright provision contained in the
TRIPS Agreement This report, handed down in June 2000, found that an
exemption introduced into section 110(5) of the U.S. CopyrightAct in 1998 violated
the rights of owners of copyright in musical works guaranteed by the Berne
Convention and incorporated within the TRIPSAgreemenL Professor Dinwoodie
concludes that the panel report is a good beginning to the new era of international
copyright The panel report is a strong and appropriate endorsement of the need
to protect the rights of copyright owners and to hold WTO members to agreed-upon
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minimum standards. In addition, the report contains hints that WTO panels will
accord some continuing respect to the value of national autonomy, will seek to
interpret the TRIPSAgreement in a dynamic fashion responsive to changing social
and economic conditions, will examine contentious issues ofcopyright law through
other than a pure trade lens, will move cautiously before finding violations of
international obligations, and will encourage the involvement of interested third
parties in the resolution of V/TO disputes. Despite this balanced beginning, the
article concludes that private international lawmaking might further forward-
looking international copyright lawmaking in ways that do not incur the costs
associated with activist V/TO lawmaking. To facilitate this process, Professor
Dinwoodie suggests that national courts consider resolving international copyright
litigation byformulating substantive rules rather than localing such disputes in
a single country through traditional choice of law rules. Such a substantive law
approach to choice oflawfits well with the objectives ofprivate international aw.
But this broader approach will also establish a means of incorporating
international norms in the formation of copyright law withoutjeopardizing values
appropriately furthered by the classical method ofpublic international copyright
lawmaking.
INTRODUCTION
International copyright law is suddenly very real. In June 2000, a panel of the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 1 issued the
first opinion (nominally, a report)2 on an alleged violation of the copyright provisions
contained in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the
TRIPS Agreement). 3 Although substantial international copyright agreements have
I See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
[hereinafter WTO Agreement] 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
2 The panel report is circulated to all the Members of the WTO (after a preliminary review
by the disputant parties) for adoption by the full Dispute Settlement Body, which is comprised of
representatives from all member states. The panel report will be adopted unless there is a
consensus not to do so. See Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 2, LEGAL INsRuJMENTS-RESuLTs OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU or Dispute Settlement
Understanding] art. 16(4). This reverses the parallel procedure under the prior GATT, whereby
reports required consensus before being adopted. The effect is to change from a system where the
losing party could block adoption of the report to a system where adoption of the report is all but
automatic. For a fuller discussion of the process, see David Palmeter, National Sovereignty and
the World Trade Organization, 2 J. WORLD INTELL PROP. 77, 78-81 (1999).
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSrRuMENTs-REsuLTs OFTHE URUGUAY ROUND,
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or the TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS
Agreement is one component of the trade agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
emanating from the Uruguay Round revision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GAT). It includes provisions on all aspects of intellectual property, including patent, trademark,
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been in place for more than a century,4 no dispute regarding member state compliance
had ever been submitted to a formal dispute settlement process,5 much less one
supported by effective enforcement mechanisms. Yet, after the adoption by the full
DSB of the panel's report6 finding a recent amendment of section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act7 to be in violation of the United States' obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement, the United States is now obliged to amend its copyright law or face
damages or trade sanctions for its violation of TRIPS. 8
This development represents a significant milepost in the transformation of
international copyright law. As the adoption of the panel report emphatically brings
home, the means by which international norms are developed and incorporated in the
making of copyright law have changed dramatically over the last fifteen years. The
process of national legislative implementation of international norms is now
supplemented by an enforceable autonomous body of international standards. But
where will, and should, international copyright go from here? In this article, I argue
that while the panel report in United States-Section 110(5) is indeed a watershed
event for international copyright law, the internationalization of copyright law can
best be achieved by adopting a broader vision of the component parts, and the
institutional actors, that will contribute to that process. In particular, I suggest an
enhanced role for private parties and private litigation in the development of
international copyright norms. To facilitate such a role, I urge reconsideration of the
current approach of U.S. courts to multinational copyright disputes, including the
adoption of a revised choice of law methodology that would permit U.S. courts to
consider international norms in the development of U.S. copyright law.9
design protection, trade secrets, and geographical indications of origin, as well as copyright. See
generally J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimun Standards ofIntellectual Property Protection under
the TRIPS Component ofthe WTOAgreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995) (providing an overview
of the TRIPS agreement).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 13-33 (discussing evolution of the Beme Convention).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 30-31 (discussing article 33 of the Beme Convention).
6 See United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act: Report of the Panel,
WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000), at http://www.wto.org (finding the U.S. Fairness in Music
Licensing Act to be in violation of TRIPS) [hereinafter Panel Report]. See generally Laurence R.
Heifer, World Music on a US. Stage: A Berne/TR IPS and Economic Analysis of The Fairness in
Music LicensingAct, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000) (analyzing possible conflicts between the Faimess
in Music Licensing Act and the TRIPS Agreement and the Bere Convention).
7See Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2830-31 (1998)
(codified in principal part at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) and at §§ 101, 504, 513 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 138-47 (discussing U.S. response to the panel report).
9 The arguments that I make for the adoption of a substantive law method to choice of law
in international copyright cases are developed at greater length in Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New
Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. Rv. 469
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To explore the future of international copyright law, in Part I of this article I first
trace the evolution of international copyright law and analyze several of the ways in
which international copyright law has changed of late. I conclude that although recent
developments, and in particular the incorporation of international copyright
obligations within the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, are important and
welcome, these same developments pose some risk to long-standing and worthy
international copyright values. In particular, if WTO panels adopt too activist an
approach to TRIPS interpretation, the fluits of cultural and economic diversity may
be threatened,10 the copyright norms that are generated may be insufficiently
reflective of the assorted philosophical underpinnings of copyright,11 and the role of
national legal systems as laboratories in the international lawmaking process may
prematurely be curtailed.12
In Part 1, I discuss the panel report in United States-Section 110(5) in light of
these conclusions. Although this single report does not, and could not of itself,
assuage the concerns identified in Part I, it does contain language respectful of
national idiosyncrasies while warning against substantial intrusions upon the
internationally guaranteed rights of authors. It is a good beginning for a new era of
international copyright law. In Part II, I suggest the ways in which private law
mechanisms (i.e., methodologies used in private litigation before national courts)
might also contribute toward the development and incorporation of international
norms in the formation of copyright law. I conclude that such mechanisms might fill
some of the gaps that are (best) left unfilled by public international lawmaking and
better provide the dynamism essential to the optimal development of copyright law
in an age of rapid technological change.
I. TBE ROAD TO TRIPS
A. The Basic Structure of the Berne Convention
International copyright relations began in earnest in 1886 with the conclusion of
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention).13 Countries participating in the discussions that led to the Convention
(2000).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 32-33 (discussing the importance of national systems
tailored to distinctive economic and cultural conditions).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 56-57 (discussing the possibly trade-centric nature of
TRIPS).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 55-56 (discussing the dangers of activist interpretation
by WTO panels).
13 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1161 UN.T.S.,
July 24, 1971, 3. See generally SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FORTHE PROTECTION
OF L1TERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKs: 1886-1986 (1987).
[Vol. 62:733
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sought to establish copyright protection internationally for the works of their
nationals. That objective could be achieved in a number of ways. A comprehensive
universal copyright law, establishing uniform standards to be applied in all adherent
countries, was advocated by several countries (most notably, Germany).14 Agreement
on a comprehensive code would, however, have required substantial compromise on
the part of most nations; even in the late nineteenth century, the copyright laws of
several European countries were sufficiently developed that clear differences existed
between them. 15 As more recent efforts at intellectual property harmonization in the
European Union (the EU) have demonstrated, achieving comprehensive unification
of laws is extremely difficult in areas where divergent national jurisprudence has
already taken root 16 And if unprincipled compromise is forced, either through
political log-rolling or language consciously susceptible of all meanings to all parties,
national courts steeped in different traditions may re-effect the historical divergence.' 7
14 See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Role of National Copyright in an Era of International
Copyfight, in TE ROLE OFNATIONAL LEGISiAION iN COPYRIGHTLAw 211,213 (Deitz, ed. 2000)
(discussing 1883 intergovernmental conference and the resolutions adopted by the three
Congresses of Authors and Artists that preceded the intergovernmental conference).
15 See RICKETSON, supra note 13, at 8-17 (summarizing national laws that existed prior to
the Berne Convention).
16 Intenational agreement is easier to forge in areas of new social (and hence legislative)
activity, such as the allocation of domain names, that arise first in an inherently non-national
setting. But difficulties arise even in that context when non-national concepts collide with
territorial rights such as those provided by national trademark laws. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
(National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name System, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 495 (2000). Moreover, while it is easier to develop a unitary international approach in
the context of new problems, attending to issues first at the intemational level may suffer from the
lack of national experimentation with different solutions. See infra text accompanying notes 55-
56.
17 For example, the EU has sought to achieve substantial harmonization of the trademark
laws of its member states. See First Council Directive 89/104 of 21 December, 1988 to
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 [the
Trademark Directive]. Yet, the U.K. courts in particular have appeared reluctant in early cases to
depart from some of the pre-directive British attitudes to trademark protection. See, e.g., Philips
Elec. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. [1998] R.P.C. 283 (Ch. 1997) (UK) (displaying
resistance to trademark protection of product shapes notwithstanding language in directive defining
trademarks in terms including product design), aff'd 1999 E.T.M.R. 816 (CA. 1999) (UK).
Benelux and U.K. courts and scholars appeared similarly entrenched in their pre-directive attitudes
toward the scope of protection afforded trademark holders. The compromise language of article
5 ofthe Trademark Directive permitted each member state to find support for its pre-directive laws.
See, e.g., Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants Ple., [1995] F.S.R. 713 (Ch.) (UK); see also
Marca Mode v. Adidas A.G., [1999] E.T.M.R. 791,796-97 (Sup. Ct.) (Neth.) (finding some room
for advancement of a modified Benelux interpretation in the language of the initial decision of the
European Court of Justice in SabelBVv. Puma AG, 1997 E.T.M.R. 283 (E.C.J. 1997)); Anselm
Kamperman Sanders, The Wagamama Decision: Back to the Dark Ages of Trade Mark Law, 18
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Moreover, a code promulgating stiff standards that reflected the state of copyright law
in the copyright-respecting nations might be an impediment to the growth in
membership of the union18 established by the Berne Convention.
The text of the 1886 Convention therefore pursued the objective of broader
international copyright protection through a different device, namely, the principle of
national treatment. The national treatfnent provision in the Berne Convention is in
essence the equal protection clause of international copyright law.19 It requires that
member countries provide nationals from, or works first published in, other member
countries with as much copyright protection as offered to their own nationals and
EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 3 (1996) (endorsing Benelux interpretation before any ECJ decision);
Peter Prescott, Think before You Waga Finger, 18 EUR. Ix'TLL. PROP. REV. 317 (1996) (rejecting
Benelux interpretation); AnselmKamperman Sanders, TheReturn to Wagamama, 18 EUR. INrELL
PROP. REv. 521 (1996) (replying to Prescott); Peter Prescott, Has the Benelux Trade Mark Law
Been Written into the Directive, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99 (1997) (replying to Kamperman
Sanders). As these examples show, the harmonization efforts of the EU thus rely heavily on the
centralizing force of the European Court of Justice. See Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.T.M.R.
283 (E.CJ. 1997) (supporting the Wagamama interpretation of the term "likelihood of association"
and rejecting Benelux interpretation); Adidas AG v. Marca Mode CV, [2000] E.T.M.R. 723
(E.CJ. 2000) (same); Philips Elec. BV v. Remington Consumer Prods.,1999 E.T.M. 816 (CA.
1999) (UK) (referring question of product design trademark protection to the European Court of
Justice). It is not surprising therefore that the European Commission recently argued that actions
for infringement of its proposed EU wide patent be heard even at first instance by centralized EU
courts sitting in Luxembourg. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE
FOLLOW-UP TO THE GREEN PAPER ON THE COMMUNITY PATENT AND THE PATENT SYSTEM IN
EUROPE (Feb. 12, 1999), at http'//europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg23/conmnercel1_blanc/lben.pdf. The
German government has already indicated its opposition to trials occurring before centralized
courts. See German Reactions on Community Patent (Aug. 17, 2000), at http'/vvw.ipr-
helpdesk.org/ten/n_006title en.aspmon=8yea=2000&nex=10.
18 Most of the major multinational intellectual property agreements establish unions. The
unions, which consist of all states that have adhered to the treaty in question, assist in the review
and revision of existing multilateral agreements. Although unions typically are governed by an
assembly of adherent countries, day to day administration is conducted (in most cases) by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WLIAM
HENNESSEY & SHIRA PERLuvUrER, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PoICY
699-700 (2001) (forthcoming) (Aug. 2000 manuscript).
19 The principle of national treatment fails in two principal ways to ensure full equality of
protection. First, the national treatment principle requires that member states accord as much
protection to foreign nationals and works as is granted domestic authors and works, but member
states may provide greater protection to foreign authors. See Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 214-15
(discussing article 5 of the Beme Convention). Second, the national treatment principle does not
guarantee equal treatment among nationals of different foreign countries. That objective is pursued
through so-called "most favored nation" obligations, first introduced into (multinational)
international copyright law from international trade law by the TRIPS Agreement in 1994. See
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4; Ricketson, supra note 13, at 36-37 (noting most favored
nation clauses in earlier bilateral copyright agreements).
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works.20 In addition, while recalcitrant about a comprehensive universal copyright
code, the parties agreed to a set of minimum standards of copyright protection that
were not nearly as extensive as those proposed by the universalists. These minimum
standards established a floor beneath which adherent countries agreed not to let
copyright protection fall, but did not prevent countries from providing greater
protection. The Berne Convention was revised five times over the next century,21 but
this basic structure-national treatment plus minimum standards-was preserved.
Three aspects of the Berne model are worth particular mention. First, these dual
components of copyright internationalization were effectuated through national law.22
That is, although international copyright law required member states to enact laws
meeting certain minimum standards, the existence and scope of protection in any
copyright infringement action would be determined by the content of national law.
There was (and is) no such thing as an international copyright The author of a novel
owns the copyright to that work in France to the extent permitted by the terms of
French copyright law, and owns the copyright in the United Kingdom according to
the provisions of U.K. law. International copyright law operates only to obligate that
such provisions, of French and U.K. law, include certain minimum levels of
protection, and that each country makes such protections available equally to
nationals from either country. Accordingly, international law was given effect only
though national implementation of international obligations.
Second, the minimum standards were in large part declaratory of existing
20 See Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(1).
2 1 See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 11-13 (1988) (summarizing the
revisions and completions of the Berne Convention). The Berne Convention was revised in Berlin
in 1908, in Rome in 1925, in Brussels in 1948, in Stockholm in 1967, and in Paris in 1971. Id.
22 he extent to which international standards are directly effective in a particular countryis
itself a question of national law. A treaty may be self-executing in some countries but not in others.
And even within one country some treaties may be self-executing while others are not. In the
United States, for example, Congress made clear in the Berne Convention Implementation Act
1988 (BCIA) that it did not regard the Berne Convention as self-executing and thus litigants in
U.S. courts could notrely on its provisions. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853. In contrast, the status of the leading international patent
and trademark treaty, the Paris Convention, is not so clear. Compare Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1299 (3d Cir. 1979), and French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy
Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427,438 (1903) (not self-executing), with Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.,
234 F.2d 633, 640-44 (2d Cir. 1956) (suggesting that the Paris Convention is self-executing, but
finding no enlargement of substantive rights under U.S. trademark law) and Laboratorios Roldan
v. Tex Int'l, 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (recognizing claim under article 10bis of
the Paris Convention), and Benard Indus. v. Bayer, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1422, 1426 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
(permitting claim under Paris Convention to proceed); see generally John B. Pegram, Trademark
Law Revision: Section 44, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 141, 158-162 (1988) (suggesting that the




national laws. 3 International agreements tended to operate behind the curve of social
and technological developments, in part because of the accepted need for consensus
in the revision of treaties. Consensus is sometimes difficult to reach even in a
domestic context; when the circle of interests is expanded to encompass nations of
widely divergent economies and traditions, consensus could prove impossible. This
became especially problematic as the number of member countries increased.24
International copyright law thus was backward-looking; national laws were elevated
to international norms as they came to reflect widespread national practice.
International norms were derivative of national positions, frequently embodying only
the lowest common denominator from which member states would deviate upwards
in differing ways and degrees.25
Third, despite minimum standards, member states retained significant license to
implement those standards in ways that were tailored to their own social, cultural, or
economic priorities. This held true even as the content of the minimum standards
became more significant during successive revisions of the Berne Convention. The
license for national autonomy flowed in part from the decision to employ truly
minimum standards, allowing different states to provide varying levels of higher
protection. But it was also reflected in the deference shown member states' own
interpretation of what was required to comply with the Convention. Thus, the United
States adhered to the Berne Convention in 1988 without offering any moral rights
protection as such (although this was required by article 6bis of the Convention).26
23 Over the years, there have been exceptions to this general statement. See STEPHEN M.
STEWART, INTERNATONAL CoPYRiGHTANDNE GmOUR]NGRIGHTS 1.16 (2d ed. 1989) (noting
compromises between civil law states adhering to a system of droit d'auteur and common law
countries following a copyright approach to authors' rights). The most significant advances
requiring changes in national legislation occurred at the Berlin revision conference of 1908. See
RICKETSON, supra note 13, at 96.
24 The ability to reach consensus is also made more difficult by the increased range of
interests affected by copyright legislation. See Dinwoodie, supra note 9, at 486-88.
25 This was seen not only in the context of the Berne Convention. In the years preceding U.S.
adherence to the Berne Convention, the same dynamic is evident in international copyright law
generally. Because of the insistence on formalities (in particular, copyright notice) in U.S.
copyright law, the United States could not join the Berne Convention. Instead, the United States
engineered the Universal Copyright Convention, which permitted the copyright notice requirement
and indeed did so in a way that accommodated U.S. law perfectly. See Barbara A. Ringer, The
Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. LJ.
1050, 1060-63 (1968) (outlining the terms of and motivations behind the Universal Copyright
Convention). Thus, here too, the United States (and other signatories of the UCC) brought to the
international level what was already commonplace at the national.
26 Article 6bis requires that:
independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
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Moral rights did not fit well with the historically instrumentalist approach of the
United States to copyright law,27 and a commitment to moral rights as such would
have provoked domestic opposition to U.S. adherence. The United States claimed
compliance based upon a collection of related state and federal causes of action that
coincidentally offered authors protection in circumstances similar to those in which
a moral rights claim might lie.28 But that argument rested as much on the deferential
attitudes shown toward member state compliance with Berne obligations as on the
substance of the U.S. law.29 Indeed, although article 33 of the Berne Convention
permitted the referral of disputes regarding compliance with the Convention to the
International Court of Justice,3 0 this mechanism was never used.31
These characteristics of the Berne system comprised important strands in the
fabric of intemational copyright law. Copyright law is an instrument of cultural and
information policy.32 As such, it embodies a nation's priorities in establishing its
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 6bis.
27 Protection akin to moral rights can, however, be justified under the prevailing philosophy
of American copyrightprotection. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14,24 (2d Cir. 1976)
(noting that the theory of economic instrumentalism upon which American copyright law is"
premised cannot be reconciled with the mutilation or misrepresentation of an artist's work that is
actionable in other countries as a violation of moral rights).
28 See HR. REP. NO.100-609, at 34 (1988) (reciting the different causes of action upon which
the argument of compliance rested). The claim gained credence from statements made by some
WIPO officials:
In my view, it is not necessary for the United States of America to enact statutory provisions on
moral rights in order to comply with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. The requirements under
this Article can be fulfilled not only by statutory provisions in a copyright statute but also by
cornmon law and other statutes.
Letter from Dr. Arpad Bogsch, Director-General of WIPO, to Irwin Karp, Esq. (June 16, 1987),
reprinted in pertinent part in H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 37 (1988).
29 See Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 655,655 (1986) ("[1]t is the
lack of effective compliance among Berne countries, rather than the protection given moral rights
in American law, that removes Article 6bis as an obstacle to U.S. adherence.").
30 See Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 33.
31 Moreover, no "state... invoke[d] the doctrine of retaliation and retorsion theoretically
available under international law for violation of intemational minimum standards of intellectual
property protection." LH. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS
Agreement, 37 VA. L INT'LL. 335,339 n.17 (1997).
32 See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a "Bundle" ofNational Copyright
Laws to a Supranational Code, 47 J. COPR. Soc'Y 265,267 (2000) ("National copyright laws are
a component of local cultural and information policies. As such, they express each sovereign
nation's aspirations for its citizens' exposure to works of authorship, for their participation in their
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cultural environment, and those priorities vary widely among countries of different
social and cultural traditions. These differences contribute to a richer diversity of
cultural products, and the Berne system thus accommodated national deviation in
order not to frustrate that diversity. And copyright law also reflects a country's
economic priorities and capacities. Although the United States joined the Berne
Convention only in 1988, it has recently sought to strengthen international copyright
law with a zealotry displayed only by converts. But the conversion has been fostered
by economic rather than philosophical considerations; the United States has gone
from a net importer of copyrighted works to the world's largest net exporter.33
Respect for national heterogeneity found in the Beme system acknowledged both the
historical and economic contingencies that drive national copyright policy and
affirmatively encouraged the cultural diversity that enriches the environment for all.
The Berne Convention thus sought to balance two (sometimes) competing objectives:
providing copyright protection on an international scale, and a respect for cultural and
economic diversity.
B. Conventional Incorporation of International Norms in U.S. Copyright
Law
The international norms articulated in the Berne Convention were incorporated
into U.S. copyright law through the domestic legislative process. This occurred even
before the United States joined the Berne Convention; several of the reforms effected
by the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 were motivated by the goal of ensuring,34 or
coming closer to,35 compliance with Berne standards. Adherence to Berne itself
country's cultural patrimony."). Former Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer, expressed this
sentiment eloquently-
Though their true influence is dimly understood at best, a nation's copyright laws lie at the
roots of its culture and intellectual climate. Copyright provides the inducement for creation
and dissemination of the works that shape our society and, in an imperfect and almost
accidental way, represents one of the foundations upon which freedom of expression rests.
Ringer, supra note 25, at 1050.
33 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property-America's Overlooked Export, 20 U.
DAYrON L. RV. 809, 811-12 (1995).
34 For example, the term of copyright in the United States was changed from an initial term
of twenty-eight years from publication plus a renewal term of equal length to a single term that
expired fifty years after the death of the author. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994), now amended by the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(extending basic term of protection to seventy years post mortem auctoris).
35 For example, section 405 of the 1976 Act mitigated the harsh consequences ofpublication
without copyright notice that had prevailed under the 1909 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1994).
Copyright protection was still dependent upon formalities, and thus not in full compliance with the
Berne Convention. But section 405 of the 1976 Revision Act can clearly be seen as a stepping
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precipitated further reforms, most notably with respect to the use of mandatory
copyright notice.36 But congressional embrace of international copyright principles
was still lukewarm in 1988, even at this moment of apparent internationalist triumph.
At that time, the United States consciously adopted a minimalist approach to the
question of Berne implementation,37 spawning complaint from elsewhere about the
extent of its compliance with its international obligations under the Convention.38 In
particular, the argument suggesting U.S. compliance with the obligation under article
6bis of the Berne Convention to provide protection of the moral rights of authors was
weak, constructed from a wide assortment of related state and federal causes of
action.39 This was acknowledged by U.S. scholars,40 and (implicitly)41 by U.S.
negotiators six years later when the TRIPS Agreement incorporated all of the
substantive copyright obligations of the Berne Convention except for article 6bis.42
Those who argued for a minimalist approach to Beme adherence as a means of
invigorating U.S. attention to international copyright have in part been vindicated by
developments since 1988. Bringing the United States within the international
copyright family (by appeasing in 1988 the opposition that a warmer endorsement of
Berne might have precipitated) has raised the international dimension as a defining
element of the national copyright lawmaking agenda. To be sure, the dominance of
the U.S. copyright industries would likely have compelled U.S. leadership on
international copyright matters by sheer economic self-interest. Expansion in global
trade and the digital environment makes international protection essential for the
world's leading exporter of copyrighted products. 43 But U.S. participation in the
Beme Convention made U.S. leadership more powerful and expressed an important
stone to the eventual revision of the notice requirement in the Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988.
3 6 See BCIA, supra note 22, § 7.
37 See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 7 (1988) (noting that Congress was "making only those
changes to American copyright law that [were] clearly required under the treaty's provisions').
3 8 See AdolfDeitz, The United States and Moral Rights: Idiosyncracy or Approximation?
Observations on a Problematical Relationship Underlying United States Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 142 REv. INT'LDU DROrrD'AuETUR 222, 238 (1989).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
4 0 See, eg., Damich, supra note 29 at 655 ("When the language of Article 6bis is compared
with the evidence that has been offered to suggest that moral rights are substantially protected in
the United States, it is clear that, aside from some recently-passed [state] statutes... moral rights
are not protected in any meaningful sense"); John M. Kemochan, Comments of John M
Kernochan, 10 COLUM.-VLA J. L. &ARTs 685, 686 (1986).
41 The rationale tendered by the United States for excluding article 6bis from the TRIPS
Agreement was that it did not involve trade issues. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEENT 72 (1998).
4 2 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 9(1).
4 3 See supra text accompanying note 33.
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policy commitment to the international arena. Absent such participation, it would
have been impossible for the United States to advance the international copyright
agenda it has pursued over the last twelve years (at least not without substantial
chutzpah).
The first fruits of the intensified U.S. attention to international commitments
came in the form of minor revisions to the Copyright Act in 1990 to provide a limited
scope of moral rights protection and copyright protection for works of architecture per
se.44 Since then, the influence of international pressure has deepened. The
international copyright philosophy of protection without formalities was extended by
the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992.4 5 International copyright treaty obligations,
whether under the TRIPS Agreement 4 6 or the recent WIPO Copyright Treaty4 7 have
been implemented promptly by Congress. And, trade interests of the U.S. copyright
44 See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat., 5133; Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128.
4 5 See Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (providing
automatic renewal of pre-1978 works in their first term of copyright).
46 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(implementing, inter alia, the TRIPS Agreement). The TRIPS Agreement required only a few
changes in U.S. copyright law, including the enactment of protection for unfixed musical
performances against unauthorized fixation. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(1994); TRIPS Agreement
supra note 3, art. 14 (requiring protection for performers against unauthorized fixation of
performances); see also 17 U.S.C. § 104A (reviving copyright protection for certain works that had
fallen into the public domain because of stricter U.S. copyright requirements). The constitutionality
of the criminal equivalent of section 1101, which was aimed at preventing the sale of bootleg
recordings of musical performances, has been challenged unsuccessfullyin the courts. See United
States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (1 1th Cir. 1999). Indeed, the possible tension between
domestic constitutional limitations and international copyright pressures has been felt in several
areas. In addition to the challenge to the bootleg provision in Moghadam, the copyright term
extension legislation (which was enacted partly in response to reciprocity conditions in the EU
Term Directive) is the subject of a pending constitutional challenge, see Eldred v. Reno, 239 F. 3d
372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute), and a challenge to proposed
U.S. database legislation (prompted in part by the EU Database Directive) is likely should the
legislation be enacted. See Memorandum from William Michael Treanor, Deputy Ass't. Att. Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, Dept of Justice, to William P. Marshall, Associate White House Counsel
(July 28, 1998) (copy on file with author); see also William F. Patry, The Enumerated Powers
Doctrine and Intellectual Property, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359, 360 (1999) (arguing that
proposed database legislation is unconstitutional).
47 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998, (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304,112 Stat.
2860 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Title I of the DMCA implemented the treaty
obligations of the United States to offer protection to copyright management information and to
provide protection against circumvention of technological protection measures designed to regulate
access to, or protect copyright in, works. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201-02 (Supp. IV 1998); see also
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65,
[hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty or WCT] arts. 11-12.
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industries have been defended by the enactment of legislation in order to prevent
disadvantage to U.S. producers internationally under reciprocity-conditioned foreign
laws.48
C. Changes to the Berne Model
Having given internationalization a more prominent role in domestic copyright
lawmaking, the United States turned to the international stage itself. The classical
Berne-inspired model of international copyright lawmaking has come under
substantial pressure. Technological advances made copyright-rich countries more
skeptical of claims for national variation. The ease with which works can be digitally
reproduced, and digitally delivered to any location in the world, means that
international protection is required by producers merely to sustain their domestic
market Respect for national autonomy and cultural diversity has given way to a
pervasive concern about offshore pirates operating in countries offering less
protection.49 Absent broad-based compliance with agreed-upon standards, producers
from developed countries would be unable to exploit their comparative advantage in
intellectual goods, and a single rogue nation could become a haven for copyright
48 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304); see also Council Directive 98/98/EEC of 29 October
1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright And Other Related Rights, 1993 O.L (L
290) art. 7(1) (conditioning full protection of foreign works for complete terms on reciprocal
protection); Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 7(8) (permitting signatory nations to apply the
rule of the shorter term, that is, to limit foreign works to the term of protection offered in their
country of origin). The pending database legislation also reflects these motivations. See Collections
ofInformation Antipiracy Act; H.R 354,106th Cong. (1999); Directive 96/9/EC of The European
Parliament and of The Council of 11 March, 1996, on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 OJ.
(L 77) art. II (authorizing the extension of protection to certain foreign rightholders). The TRIPS
Agreement elevates national treatment as the guiding principle of international intellectual property
relations not only with respect to copyright issues covered by the Berne Convention, but with
respect to intellectual property rights generally (as that term is defined in the TRIPS Agreement).
This should limit the ability of WTO countries to incorporate reciprocity conditions in new
intellectual property legislation. See Reichman, supra note 3, at 347-50 (discussing the national
treatment provision of TRIPS); cf .1J. Reichman, Statement Concerning H.R. 2652 before the
Subcommittee on the Judiciary, House ofRepresentatives, 105th Cong. 15-16 (Oct. 23, 1997),
available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41121.htm (arguing that the reciprocity condition
included by the EU in its database directive is a violation of the EU's national treatment
obligations).
49 The development of "offshore" copyright havens may, in fact, soon be quite literally true.
See Steven Chase, Napster Clone May Set Up Shop Offshore, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar.
5,2001 (reporting that a Canadian "entrepreneur" was looking to operate Napster's music-sharing
system, found to violate U.S. copyright law, from Sealand, a converted oil platform off the U.K.
coast). The corporation that operates from Sealand does so under the eponymous name of Haven
Co., Ltd. See id.
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pirates and flood the international market with unauthorized copies. And the
increased trade significance of the copyright industries to the developed world has
merely heightened this concern. Beyond these arguments grounded in economic self-
interest, cultural convergence across countries may have weakened the link between
nationally distinct copyright laws and national cultural policy.
As a consequence, the developed world (in particular) sought to alter the balance
between international protection and deference to national autonomy found in the
Berne model. The United States decided that these changes could be pursued
through, in addition to the traditional WIPO-based processes, the trade mechanisms
of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and unilateral trade sanctions under the
amended Trade Act of 1974. These additional venues, allied to increased attention to
intellectual property protection in developing the internal market of the European
Union,50 precipitated changes in the international copyright system. These changes
took several forms. First, issues raised by new technological developments have been
addressed at the international level simultaneously with (or soon after) their treatment
at the national level. International copyright law had to be ahead ofthe curve, tackling
new technological issues rather than codifying developed national consensus. Second,
the institutional structure of the fora in which issues are brought to the international
stage has enabled speedier development of international norms.51 And, third, as
already noted, international copyright standards have been brought within an effective
enforcement mechanism in the form of the WTO Dispute settlement system.
These changes are most evident in the context of the WTO, but they are apparent
elsewhere. For example, the European Union has over the past decade mandated
substantial reform of the copyright laws of its constituent states, addressing many new
issues not fully developed at the national level.52 And it has done so at a rapid pace
50 See generally Alexander A. Caviedes, International Copyright Law. Should the European
Union Dictate Its Development? 16 B.U. INT'LL. J. 165,209-22(1998) (discussing copyright law
in the European Community).
5 1 In the WTO context, for example, the cross-sectoral nature of GATT negotiations enabled
concessions on matters of copyright law to be matched by accommodations on any number of
other (non-intellectual property) issues, facilitating compromise on international copyright
standards.
52 In addition to the five directives adopted between 1991 and 1996, see Caviedes, supra note
50, at 211-18, which tackled topics such as satellite broadcasting, database protection, and
computer software, the EU has in the past year adopted its E-Commerce Directive, which includes
provisions limiting the liability of intemet service providers for (among other things) copyright
infringement See Council Directive 2000/31/EC on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society
Services, in Particular, Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 OJ. (L 178), arts. 12-
14. The EU is also close to adoption of a further directive addressing issues raised by the intemet
environment in which copyrighted works now flow; in particular, this directive will implement the
WIPO Copyright Treaty. See COMMON PosmoN ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL WnH A VIEW TO THE
ADOPTION OF A DmEcrrvE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE
HARMONISATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION
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facilitated by lawmaking procedures that can operate without consensus, and within
the context of an effective judicial mechanism that ensures compliance with those
standards. Similarly, the WIPO has reformed its institutional structure to enable it to
respond more quickly (principally through the creation of soft law) to the demands
of lawmaking in a more fast-changing environment 53 And, the most recent copyright
treaties agreed through the offices of WIPO addressed issues still unsettled in most
national laws, namely the enactment of prohibitions on the circumvention of
technological measures restricting access to a copyrighted work 5
4
Clearly, these changes burnish international copyright law in several important
ways. Most particularly, international copyright law is less backwards-looking and has
greater potential to deal with new problems in a timely fashion. Copyright lawmaking
must be adaptive to constant technological and social change; it must be dynamic. But
if copyright lawmaking also demands internationalism, then our internationalizing
instruments must likewise be dynamic. One of the weaknesses of the classical model
was its consolidating character, suited well to the era where international copyright
law was a matter of incremental state-to-state diplomacy rather than an integral part
of copyright law formation.
The TRIPS Agreement in itself is hardly dynamic; it remains difficult to
amend.55 But the incorporation of TRIPS within the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism could change the nature of international copyright law. WTO panels
could, if they wished, adopt a dynamic interpretive methodology designed to ensure
that the copyright standards in the TRIPS Agreement stay current with, and adapt to,
the new social and technological realities that domestic copyright law confronts on
a daily basis. And any such decisions would be backed by effective enforcement
mechanisms.
If panels were to adopt an activist approach to TRIPS interpretation, however,
this might also produce costs for the international copyright system. The content of
copyright law is historically contingent Premature and excessive internationalization
of copyright standards-the flip-side of dynamic international lawmaking-might
ignore such contingencies and shape a copyright law to fit all that ends up fitting none
particularly well. And it would do so without the benefit of the different national
"experiments" that tolerance of variation classically facilitated. Moreover, the
SOCIETY, (Sept. 14, 2000), at http'j/register.consilium.eu.intlpdf/en/OO/stO9/09512enO.pdf;
COMMISsIONER BOLKEIN WELCOMES EUROPEAN PARuAmENT VOTE ON COPYRIGHT DiRECV,
Feb. 14, 2001, at http/wvv.europa.eu.int/cormrintemalmarket/en/intprop/ntprop/news/01-
210.htm (commenting on the European Parliament vote endorsing compromise amendments to
the Information Society Directive).
53 See Report ofthe Director General of WIPO, WO/GA/23/1 (Sept. 4, 1998) (discussing the
proposal to establish standing committees on a range of topics).
54 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 47.
55 See Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral Trading System in the Context of
TRIPS, 20 HAsNGs INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 661,667-68 (1997) (discussing amendment process).
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institutional surroundings in which the dynamic development would occur, namely
WTO panels interpreting a trade agreement, might distort the content of international
copyright law. Putting aside the broader debate regarding the legitimacy of the WTO
as a lawmaking body,56 there is a danger that a trade body might adopt a less well-
rounded vision of copyright law. Copyright law is about more than trade. It is central
to questions of cultural policy, free expression, and the pursuit of liberal democratic
values. 57 Yet, panelists will be mandated to develop international copyright law in a
narrow trade context and it is not clear what effect that would have on the content of
international copyright law.
II. UNITED STATES-SECTION 110(5)
A. The Panel Report
The United States has been the most frequent complainant in TRIPS cases to
date.58 But the first copyright case to produce a panel report was brought against the
United States by the European Union. There is, of course, a further irony in this.
While the United States and the European Union were on the opposite sides of many
issues in the GATT negotiations, intellectual property protection was one area where
their views were largely cQngruent.59
The EU complaint arose out of a 1998 amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act.
Section 110 of the Act provides a series of exemptions from the exclusive right of the
author to make public performances of her work. Since the Copyright Revision Act
of 1976, section 110(5) has exempted public performances of works, typically by
bars, restaurants, and retail stores, that occur by the use of audio and video receiving
56 See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsessian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 511,512-13 (2000) (noting critiques of the WTO).
57 See Harper & Row v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (describing copyright
as 'the engine of free expression"); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, 106 YALE L.L 283 (1996) (describing the ways in which copyright supports a democratic
civil society).
58 See Matthijs Geuze & Hannu Wager, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the
TRlPSAgreement, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 347,348-49 (1999). A continually updated summary of the
status of WTO proceedings generally (not limited to TRIPS matters) can be found at WTO,
OVERVIEW OF THE STATE-OF-PLAY OF WTO DIsPUTES http://www.wto.orgfenglish/tratope/
dispu._e/stplay_e.doc (last visited Apr. 7, 2001). The United States has brought (but settled)
copyright complaints. See OFFICE OF TBE UNrED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATTVE, RESULTS OF
SPECIAL 301 ANNUAL REVIEW (April 30, 1999) (reporting progress of previously-filed WTO
TRIPS cases, including case against Greece for failure to protect televisual works).
59 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. L INT'L L. 275, 276
(1997).
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apparatus of a type commonly found in private homes. 60 In short, this so-called
"homestyle" exemption enabled bars and restaurants to turn on televisions and radios
in their establishments without having to make payment to the copyright owners61 of
works that were thereby publicly performed.62
The version of section 110(5) originally enacted in 1976 had long been viewed
by some other countries as a potential violation of the Beme Convention.63 But in the
pre-TRIPS days of deferential attitudes and lack of enforcement mechanisms, the
United States went unchallenged. The prospect of dispute settlement under the WTO
system changed that dynamic. In 1998, moreover, Congress broadened the scope of
section 110(5) by enacting the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (FIMLA). In addition
to modifying the original homestyle exemption (which became section 1 10(5)(A)),
FIMLA created two additional sets of exemptions (which the WTO panel later
referred to, collectively, as the "business exemption").64 First, it granted an absolute
exemption (regardless of the nature of the equipment used) for establishments under
60 Section 110(5) does not applyto the use of recorded music, such as CDs or cassette tapes,
or to live performances of music. It is restricted to performances that occur by the communication
of transmissions. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (Supp. IV 1998).
61 Composers and lyricists who own the copyright in musical works typically entrust the
licensing of nondramatic public performance of their works to performing rights organizations,
such as (in the United States) ASCAP, and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). These organizations
license the performance of works on behalf of the copyright owners, collect and distribute the
revenue thus generated, and enforce the rights of the copyright owner against infringing
establishments. See generally John M. Kemochan, Music Perorming Rights Organizations in the
United States ofAmerica: Special Characteristics, Restraints, and Public Attitudes, 10 COLuM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTs 333 (1986).
62 In addition to the requirement that the receiving apparatus has to be "of a kind commonly
used in private homes," section 110(5) only applie[d] if the establishment did not impose a "direct
charge... to see or hear the transmission [and the] transmission thus received was [not] further
transmitted to the public." 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(1994).
6 3 See Heifer, supra note 6, at 135 n. 179 (noting pre-FIMLA objections).
64 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). The original homestyle exemption applied to
public performances of all types of works. However, the language of the additional exemptions
introduced by the FIMLA was understood by both the United States and the EU to have altered
the scope of the homestyle exemption. Because the introductory phrase "except as provided in
subparagraph (B)" was added to the text of the homestyle provision, and the new subparagraph (B)
applied to "a performance or display of a nondramatic musical work," the parties and the panel
accepted that the scope of the homestyle exemption was narrowed to works other than nondramatic
musical works. See Panel Report, supra note 6, 2.8. Under this reading, the revised homestyle
exemption is limited to such musical works as are not covered by subparagraph (B), and thus
applies only to such activities as a communication of a broadcast of a dramatic rendition of the
music written for an opera. See idJ This interpretation of the revised homestyle provision has not
been tested in the U.S. courts, and nothing in the legislative history of the FIMLA suggests that
Congress intended this change. See Heifer, supra note 6, at 97 n.7 (explaining why such an
interpretation lacks support either in the statutory language or the legislative history).
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defined sizes, the particular size varying as between "retail establishments" and "food
service and drinking establishments. '65 Second, an exemption was available to
establishments of either type exceeding those limits if the establishment complied
with express limits on the number, size, and location of the equipment.66
Article 1 lbis(1)(iii) of the Beme Convention provides that authors of musical
works67 "shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing... the public communication
by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or
images, the broadcast of the work." Article 11(1)(ii) additionally provides that
"authors of dramatic, dramatic-musical and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive
right of authorizing... any communication to the public of the performance of their
works."68 The EU argued that the homestyle and business exemptions were
inconsistent with these provisions of the Berne Convention, as incorporated within
the TRIPS Agreement by article 9(1).69 The United States defended the exemptions
under article 13 of TRIPS, which provides that 'Members shall confine limitations
or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with
a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder."70
The first of the cumulative requirements of article 13's so-called "three step test"
for permissible exceptions is that any exceptions are limited to "certain special
65The size limits are 2,000 gross square feet (186 rn2) for retail establishments and 3,750
gross square feet (348 rn2) for restaurants. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. IV 1998).
66 The limits on equipment relate to screen size and to the number and location of
loudspeakers. See id. Although the equipment limits varied as between audio and audio-visual
performances, the same limits apply to both retail establishments and restaurants above the
respective size limits. See id. Regardless of the size or nature of the establishment, the business
exemption applies only if no direct charge was made to see or hear the transmission and if the
transmission was not further transmitted to the public. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(iii)-(iv) (Supp. IV
1998).
67 The language of the provision is cast in terms of 'literary and artistic works," but this
includes musical works. See Beme Convention, supra note 13, art. 2(1) (defining 'literary and
artistic works").
68 Article I lbis(1)(iii) covers the activities of the exempted establishments in so far as the
communication was made to the public of a broadcast which has been transmitted at some point
by hertzian waves; article I l(1)(ii) applies to the extent that the entire transmission has been by
wire. See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.26.
69 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 9(1) (obliging WTO Members to comply with
articles 1-21 of the Beme Convention, with the exception of article 6bis on moral rights).
70 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 13. The term "exception" is commonly understood
as permitting a wholly uncompensated use of the work, while "limitation" ordinarily refers to a
reduction in the right from an exclusive right to a right to receive compensation or some other
benefit that falls short of an exclusive right.
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cases."71 As one might expect in almost all TRIPS copyright disputes, the parties'
arguments reflected the competing demands of universalism and national autonomy
first reconciled over a century ago in the Bene Convention. The EU argued that any
exemption should serve a "special purpose,"'72 thus requiring the WTO panel to
engage in an independent assessment of the merits of the underlying objectives of the
national law. The panel declined to do so, accepting the U.S. position that the phrase
"special cases" at the most required that any exemption had some specific policy
objective,73 thereby apparently exhibiting the deference to national autonomy
emblematic of pre-TRIPS attitudes to international copyright law.74 The panel's
conclusion was, however, largely premised upon a literal analysis of the language of
article 13, rather than any fidelity to pre-TRIPS attitudes. It was from an examination
of the dictionary meanings of "certain," "special," and "cases" that the panel deduced
that any exception must simply be clearly defined75 to "guarantee[ ] a sufficient
71 See id
72 Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.105.
73 The United States claimed that the specific policy objective underlying the business
exemption was the "fostering [of] small businesses and preventing abusive tactics by [collective
management organizations]." Id. 6.115. As to the homestyle exemption, the United States
identified the "protection of small 'mom and pop' businesses which 'play an important role in the
American social fabric' because they 'offer econornic opportunities for women, minorities,
immigrants and welfare recipients for entering the economic and social mainstream' as the
primary purpose. See Id 6.156; see also Conference Report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 75 (1976) (noting that the original homestyle exemption was intended "to exempt a small
commercial establishment 'which was not of sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, a
subscription to a commercial background music service"). The panel did not consider whether
these stated objectives were in any way furthered by the legislative means chosen, let alone
whether FIMLA was a rational means, or a particularly appropriate, or a well-tailored means, or
the least burdensome means, of pursuing these objectives, to mention but some of the standards
that a more intrusive analysis might have applied.
74 Although the panel accepted that an exception might be permissible under this step of the
test even if the legitimacy of its purpose "in a normative sense cannot be discemed,"it also noted
that the stated legislative purposes might assist in inferring whether the exception was well-defined
or sufficiently narrow to satisfy the requirement of being applicable to "certain special cases." The
panel's opinion thus makes extensive reference not only to the language of Section 110(5) in both
its original and revised form but also to congressional explication thereof. The panel used the stated
purpose of the homestyle exemption to support its conclusion that Congress intended to establish
a narrow exemption. See Panel Report. supra note 6, % 6.112, 6.157.
75 Id 6.108. However, the panel found it unnecessary that national legislation "identify
explicitly each and every possible situation to which the exception could apply, provided that the
scope of the exception is known and particularised?'Id This bodes well for the United States were
the doctrine of fair use to be challenged, a possibility that several commentators have raised. See
Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine- 39 COLUM. J. TRANs. L. 75, 78 n.5
(2000) (noting suggestions by Professor Reichman, and by Professors Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld,
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degree of legal certainty," and also "limited in its field of application or exceptional
in its scope," so that the case to which the exception applied was not the rule.76
Even under this interpretation of the first condition of article 13, however, the
panel found that the business exemption applied to more than certain special cases.
Although the business exemption was well-defined, it was not limited in reach
because of the large percentage of establishments that could potentially benefit from
it A range of studies77 suggested that 70% of eating and drinking establishments and
45% of retail establishments78 were potentially covered by the business exemption.79
that there might be a conflict between the fair use doctrine and article 13 of TRIPS); see also Tyler
G. Newby, What's Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use Doctrine
Violate International Copyright Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (1999) (concluding that the fair use
defense is consistent with international copyright law). After conducting an analysis of the Section
110(5) opinion, Professor Okediji remains unassured. See Okediji, supra, at 114-36.
76 See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.107-110. The panel elaborated thus:
In other words, an exception or limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative
sense. This suggests a narrow scope as well as an exceptional or distinctive objective. To put this
aspect of the first condition into the context of the second condition ('no conflict with a normal
exploitation'), an exception or limitation should be the opposite of a non-special, i.e., a normal
case.
Id. 6.109.
77 These percentages were derived from studies conducted by the U.S. Congressional
Research Service in 1995 (in connection with legislative debate regarding FIMLA), by the National
Restaurant Association (at the request of the United States) in 1998, and by Dun & Bradstreet (at
the request ofASCAP) in 1999. Id. % 6.121-122. Rather than seriously contest those numbers,
the United States argued that several categories of establishment should be subtracted from the
calculation for the purposes of analysis, such as those that did not play music, that would not do
so if they became liable to pay fees, or that played music from sources other than radio or
television. Id 6.126. The panel agreed with the European Union, however, that it was the scope
of potential users that was relevant; in particular, the panel was conscious of the impact that the
exemption might have on other substitutable sources of music. Id 6.127. The United States also
sought to reduce'the number of potentially covered establishments by noting that the business
exemption was conditioned upon the establishment not charging direct admission fees to hear the
music nor further transmitting the performance. The EU disputed the effect of these conditions,
but in any event the panel was not presented with information regarding whether these conditions
would significantly reduce the number of potentially covered establishments, thus preventing any
weight being given to the argument See Id. 6.130.
78 In setting the baseline premises for this calculation, the panel explicitly referred to the
preparatory works that led to article I lbis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention, which indicated that
article 11 bis(lXiii) was intended to provide right holders with a right to authorize the use of their
works in the types of establishments covered by the business exemption. Id 6.131.
79 Indeed, these numbers may have been conservative, as they reflected the percentage of
establishments who could avail themselves of the exemption without regard to equipment
limitations. Many larger establishments could additionally be covered by the exemption if they
complied with the equipment limitations found in FIMILA. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B).
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The panel held that a provision exempting a major part of the users that were
specifically intended to be covered by article 1 lbis(1)(iii) could not be considered a
special case.
The panel applied the same considerations to the homestyle exemption and found
that it was restricted to certain special cases as evidenced both by the lesser number
of establishments to which it applied and by its limitation to dramatic musical works
(such as operas or musicals). 80 Here, the methodological commitment to national
autonomy appeared even stronger. The EU argued that the concept of "a single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes" was not well-defined
because technology continually altered the meaning of that phrase and because U.S.
courts had applied a variety of approaches81 and factors in applying the original
exemption.82 The panel found that while any exemption must be restricted to cases
that are '"nown and particularised," they need not be "explicitly identified," and that
the concept of "homestyle" equipment was sufficiently clear to satisfy this
80 See Panel Report, supra note 6, IM 6.142, 61A8. The panel foundthat, from a quantitative
perspective, the reach of the original homestyle exemption was limited to a comparably small
percentage (between 13 and 18%) of relevant establishments. Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.142.
' This calculation was premised upon the argument, supported by the legislative history to the 1976
Act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 86-87 (1976), that the outer space limits of
establishments covered by the exemption approximated those at issue in the Supreme Court case
of Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
81 The United States noted that this phenomenon was a typical feature of a common-law
system and that the concept had been proven sufficiently clear for U.S. courts to reasonably and
consistently apply in a number of cases. See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.136. Any conclusion
to the contraryby the panel, essentially indicting the common law form of adjudication, might have
run counter to the purportedly targeted spirit of TRIPS by requiring the United States to implement
a system ofjudging copyright cases distinct from that which it operates generally. Cf TRIPS, supra
note 3, art. 41(5) (the obligations in TRIPS requiring adequate procedures for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights do not create an obligation "to put in place a judicial system for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of laws in
general"). Beneath the surface, however, many commentators have touted the long-term, and more
broad-based, effects that compliance with WTO obligations might have on the judicial systems
prevailing in certain member countries, most notably China. See China Opens Up, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 20, 1999 at 17.
82 The panel summarized the leading factors considered by U.S. courts as (i) the physical size
of an establishment in terms of square footage (in comparison to the size oftheAiken restaurant);
(ii) the extent to which the receiving apparatus was to be considered as one commonly used in
private homes; (iii) the distance between the receiver and the speakers; (iv) the number of speakers;
(v) whether the speakers were free-standing or built into the ceiling, (vi) whether, depending on
its revenue, the establishment was of a type that would normally subscribe to a background music
service; (vii) the noise level of the areas within the establishment where the transmissions were
made audible or visible; and (viii) the configuration of the installation. Panel Report, supra note
6, 6.139.
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requirement 83 Although the panel rested its determination on factual findings
regarding what is currently perceived as homestyle equipment in the United States,
it was apparently untroubled by the possibility that the notion of homestyle equipment
"might vary between different countries, is subject to changing consumer preferences
in a given country, and may evolve as a result of technological development 84 This
is important both in recognizing the technological and social differences among
member states and in acknowledging the heightened need for copyright to embody
dynamnic concepts. 85
Although the panel's conclusion on the first condition was sufficient to find the
business exemption in violation of TRIPS, it also considered the second and third
conditions of the three-step test (which the homestyle exemption had to satisfy to be
in compliance with TRIPS).86 The second condition requires that the exemption must
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work.87 Again, the panel resorted to
dictionary definitions of "normal" and "exploitation" to inject content into this
provision, and to identify those means employed by copyright owners to extract
economic value from their rights with which the exemption could not permissibly
interfere.88
This literal analysis of the word "normal" revealed two connotations by which
the panel could assess the means of exploitation. 89 The first connotation suggested
that the panel engage in an empirical analysis of what was typical or usual.90
"Normal" could not mean full exploitation of the rights of the copyright owner, or
article 13 would be of no scope.91 The United States suggested that in determining
what lesser scope of exploitation would be considered normal, the panel should
consider not only the means by which a copyright owner might reasonably be
expected to exploit his work, but also the most important means by which he did so.
(The United States argued that the exemptions at issue affected only secondary uses
of broadcasts.)92 The panel accepted the relevance of the copyright owner's
83 See Id 6.145 ('In our view, a Member is not required to identify homestyle equipment
in terms of exceedingly detailed technical specifications in order to meet the standard of clarity set
by the first condition.").
84 Id.
8 5 See Dinwoodie, supra note 9, at 483-85.
8 6 Panel Report, supra note 6, N 6.160-161.
8 7 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 13.
8 8 Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.165 n.150, 6.166 n.151.
89 See Id. 6.166 ("The first one appears to be of an empirical nature, i.e., what is regular,
usual, typical or ordinary. The other one reflects a somewhat more normative, if not dynamic,
approach, i.e., conforming to a type or standard.").
90 Id. 1.66.
91 Id. 1.167.
92 See Id. 6.168. Rights holders also receive royalties from broadcasting stations who
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"reasonable" means of exploitation, but was reluctant to attach much weight to
whether the activity involved was "an important" means of exploitation. The
copyright owner should be able to engage in normal exploitation of all of the
exclusive rights guaranteed by international copyright law. The U.S. argument would
enable one of these rights to be wholly undermined by remunerative exploitation of
the other rights.93 Again, the panel sought (and found) support in the text of the Beme
Convention, under which the different rights of the copyright owner are separately
delineated. 94
The second connotation of normalcy required the panel to adopt a "normative
approach to defining normal exploitation,... includ[ing], inter alia, a dynamic
element capable of taking into account technological and market developments. 95
This normative component was, however, apparently understood by the panel in
purely economic terms: An exception would not rise "to the level of a conflict with
a normal exploitation of the work... if uses, that in principle are covered by that right
but exempted under the exception or limitation, enter into economic competition with
the ways that right holders normally extract economic value from that right to the
work.., and thereby deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains."96 In
transmit the performance of the musical works. The United States viewed these as the most
important means of exploitation ofthe work.
93 See Id 6.172.
A possible conflict with a normal exploitation of a particular exclusive right cannot be counter-
balanced or justified by the mere fact of the absence of a conflict with a nornal exploitation of
another exclusive right (or the absence of any exception altogether with respect to that right), even
if the exploitation of the latter right would generate more income.
Id. The panel's analysis of this argument thus rejects the "double-dipping" criticism that bar
owners used tojustify the homestyle and similar exemptions. See Heifer, supra note 6, at 116-17
(explaining double-dipping argument).
94 See Id. 6.171. This issue arises also in the context of a larger debate that is under way
regarding the conception of copyright as a bundle of separate (defined) rights. See Shim Perlmutter,
Convergence and the Future of Copyright, Paper Presented to ALAI Study Days 10-11
(Stockholm, June 18-20, 2000) (copy on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (predicting that a
single right to "exploit or disseminate" a work is "likely to replace the current 'bundle' of separate
economic rights," the latter approach reflecting nothing more than serial responses to new
technological uses).
95 Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.178. The panel assessed normalcy primarily by reference
to the U.S.,market, and did not need to address the EU contention that "comparative references to
other countries with a similar level of socio-economic development could be relevant to
corroborate or contradict data from the country primarily concerned." See Id. 6.189. The panel
noted cryptically that "while the WTO Members are free to choose the method of implementation,
the minimum standards of protection are the same for all ofthem."Id This does not appear to rule
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contrast, "exceptions or limitations would be presumed not to conflict with a normal
exploitation of works if they are confined to a scope or degree that does not enter into
economic competition with non-exempted uses."97 This economic focus offers a
somewhat narrow normative vision, although one that may have been forced on the
panel by the nature of the dispute before it.98 And, as Jane Ginsburg has noted, the
panel did preface its articulation of this standard by noting that this was "one way of
measuring" the normalcy of an exploitation.99
The United States argued that under this standard the business exemption did not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work because (i) it applied to many
establishments that had never been licensed l°° by collective management
organizations because of administrative difficulties l l (and thus it merely codified
normal licensing practices), and (ii) many other establishments would either have
been exempt under the homestyle exemption or covered by an almost identical
exemption under the group licensing agreement between the National Licensed
Beverage Association and collective management organizations.' 0 2 Thus, FIMLA
exempted only a small number of users from whom copyright holders could
reasonably expect to have received license fees.103
97 Id. 6.181.
98 Even accepting the confines within which the panel was operating, it is dimcult to see how
analysis of"those forms of exploitation which, with a certain degree oflikelihood and plausibility,
could acquire economic significance"- which the panel suggested might infuse the second step
with normative meaning, Id. 6.180 - is anything other than a forward looking version of the
empirical analysis. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational CopyightLaw? The WTO Panel
Decision and the 'Three Step Test"for Copyright Exceptions, REVUE INT'LDU DROrrD'AuTmUR
(2001) (manuscript at 14-15) (forthcoming) (copy on file with author) (suggesting that this
standard appears to "anticipate what the empirical situation will be, [rather] than [provide] an
explanation of what the right holder's markets should cover" and offering a more developed
suggestion of what a normative analysis might involve).
99 Ia at 7 (citing Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.180).
100 The legislative history to the 1976 Act suggested that part of the motivation ofthe original
homestyle exemption was to embody in legislation the scope of licensing that was occurring in
practice. See Conference Report, supra note 73, at 75.
101 The EU took issue with the claim of administrative difficulties, pointing to the existence
of parallel licensing arrangement in the EU and to the lack of an equivalent exemption for recorded
music. See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.191.
102 Id 6.190.
103 The panel emphasized again that it was the potential rather than merely actual impact of
an exception that was relevant. Id 6.184, see also supra note 77. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994)
(effect on potential market for copyrighted work to be considered as part of fair use analysis). As
applied to the dispute before it, this meant that the panel would consider the effect of the
exemption not only on those who actually make unauthorized use of the musical works, but also
by those who maybe induced to do so by the possibility of free use. See Panel Report, supra note
6, 6.186.
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The panel found both of these arguments irrelevant It acknowledged that,
according to a variety of studies, a relatively low number of restaurants likely to play
music were licensed. 104 But whether or not the rights holders fully exercise their
rights could not, in the panel's view, be 'ully 'indicative of normal exploitation."1 05
And although the panel did not elaborate why the allegedly minimal extent to which
the business exemption expanded the homestyle exemption was not relevant, on its
face this argument operates from the wrong baseline and would permit serial
expansions of independently minimal exceptions to effect a substantial intrusion upon
rights. In the same vein, the panel was unconvinced that codification of existing
(non-)licensing practices warranted a presumption that such codification did not
conflict with normal exploitation.106 The panel correctly noted that:
this would equate "normal exploitation" with "normal remuneration" practices existing
at a certain point in time in a given market or jurisdiction. If such exceptions were
permissibleper se, any curent state and degree of exercise of an exclusive right by right
holders could effectively be 'fozen."... Whe licensing practices of the CMOs in a
given market at a given time do not define the minimum standards of protection under
the TRIPS Agreement that have to be provided under national legislation. 107
This part of the panel's opinion implicates the role of social and commercial
practices in shaping the meaning of article 13 of TRIPS. By declining to derive
presumptions or conclusions merely from the codification of present or past
exploitation practice-here, a presumption that the non-licensed practices were not
normal means of exploitation-the panel freed international copyright law from
potential stagnation. The feasibility of licensing certain uses of works may change as
technology develops and social practices evolve (not unrelated factors, to be sure).
What once was economically inefficient or otherwise impmctical may become simple
to effect in different times. 108 Digital delivery of works, for example, may permit the
efficient licensing of works in circumstances where transaction costs formerly
discouraged copyright owners from seeking compensation. 109 Thus, immunizing




108 Of course, technological and social developments may also reduce the feasibility of
controlling certain forms of exploitation, perhaps causing national legislators to consider a revision
of exemptions or limitations in the other direction. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114
F. Supp.2d 896, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (noting, with disapproval, the "emerging sense of
entitlement to free music" caused bythe availability of the Napster software), affld 239 F3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001); see also Different Tunes, Bus. WK. Mar. 5,2001, at 51 (noting the possibility of
compulsory licensing of online music in light of the Napster case).
109 See Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Prop erty and the National Information Infrastructure:
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exemptions created for uses currently uncontrolled by the copyright owner would
freeze international copyright law according to outdated social contexts.
The panel's rejection of the reliance by the United States upon existing
practices---if extended to an analysis of licensing (as opposed to non-licensing)
practices-would also ensure that the content of international copyright law would
not become unduly subservient to the effects of market power. Use of the concept of
"reasonably expected markets" to set the parameters of permissible exceptions
inevitably involves some bootstrapping. This has been recognized by U.S. courts
interpreting a similar concept under the fair use doctrine of U.S. law.110 Just as the
underenforcement of rights, whether due to generous national exceptions or practical
difficulties, should not ofitself validate (as "not in conflict with normal exploitation)
an exemption that codifies those practices, so too the mere fact that a rights holder has
been able (perhaps through commercial leverage, or perhaps through threat of
litigation) to extract licensing fees should not be the sole determinant in setting the
parameters of normal exploitation. 111
This analysis highlights the need to avoid per se rules that would enable isolated
commercial practices to determine the content of international standards. But any
weight (even ifproperly not dispositive weight) that is attached to market exploitation
also requires consideration of the markets to which a panel should look. Just as
international copyright law should recognize that technological possibilities and social
practices will vary over time, so too those possibilities and practices may vary from
one country and culture to another. The panel recognized that international copyright
The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 58-59 (1995) (touting the effect
of the internet on the ability of copyright owners to extract payment for uses over which they
presently have no effective control).
110 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1407 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (Ryan, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the analysis of "traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed markets" in assessing the market harm factor in fair use determinations);
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913,930 (2d Cir. 1995) (same).
111 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931 (noting that "the vice of such circular reasoning arises only
if the availability of payment is conclusive against fair use"). There is, of course, a difference
between allowing practices to affect, on the one hand, interpretation ofnational law on fair use,
and, on the other, international standards on permissible exceptions. How states in practice
interpret and implement their international obligations may affect the interpretation and content
of international laws. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), art.
31 (3)(b) (in interpreting a treaty, there shall be taken into account "any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreements of the parties regarding its
interpretation), opened for signature May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 33 1; cf Thomas v. Washington
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (disapproving of existing case law interpreting the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it allowed the meaning of that clause to be affected
by the language of state legislation). But there is also a difference between state practice, which
may reveal one treaty party's understanding of international obligations, and practices pursued by
private rightholders. Cf infra note 128 (noting panel discussion of whether private agreements are
relevant in assessing compliance of national law with international standards).
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standards should not be frozen in a single time. Should they be frozen in a single
place? Efficiency arguments which are strong in one country may have little (or more)
force in other countries with different social or economic structures or where rights
holders are organized or compensated in different ways. This is significant if the
inability to enforce rights through efficient market mechanisms may permissibly be
considered by a state in crafting exceptions (which may hold true, notwithstanding
that the panel opinion disallowsper se reliance upon practices partly reflecting such
concerns). This question implicates once again the age-old dilemma of universality
versus national tailoring, a dichotomy that still comprises the subtext of most of the
debates in international copyright law.
In reaching its conclusion on this second condition of the three-step test (lack of
conflict with normal exploitation), the panel was significantly influenced (as it had
been in interpreting the first condition) by the large percentage of establishments that
are eligible to benefit from the business exemption. This suggested that the exemption
interfered with a major potential source of royalties for the exercise of the exclusive
rights contained in articles 1 lbis(l)(iii) and 1 l(l)(ii) of the Berne Convention.1 12
Although the panel thus concluded that the business exemption conflicted with
a normal exploitation of the work within the meaning of the second condition of
article 13,113 once again it reached a different conclusion with respect to the
homestyle exemption. 114 The panel hinted, but did not decide, that the original
homestyle exemption would be treated favorably under this second condition (based
upon its "confinement to a comparatively small percentage of all eating, drinking, and
retail establishments in the United States"). 115 The amended homestyle exemption
clearly did not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work.116 There is no
collective licensing mechanism for dramatic musical works-the subject of the
112 Panel Report, supra note 6, 6206. The panel also noted that onlyhistorical reasons had
been tendered by the United States for the different treatment of the playing of musical works from
CDs and tapes or by live music (all of which are not exempt) and broadcast music (covered by
section 110(5)). Payment for public performance of these works by only slightly different means
thus seemed to confirm that the business exemption constituted an interference with normal
exploitation. Indeed, the panel noted that:
the differentiation between different types of media may induce operators of establishments covered
by subparagraph (B) to switch from recorded or live music, which is subject to the payment of a
fee, to music played on the radio or television, which is free of charge. This may also create an










amended homestyle exemption-and there is little direct licensing of retail or food
and drinking establishments by individual owners of rights in such works. 117 Thus,
an exemption limited to such works was unlikely to acquire substantial economic or
practical importance to right holders,1 18 and thus did not conflict with a normal
exploitation of works within the meaning of the second condition of article 13.119
In tackling the third condition of article 13's three-step test, the panel again
started with the dictionary definition of the component terms:12 0 the exemption must
not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." 121
Importantly, this analysis of the "ordinary meaning" of these terms in itself persuaded
the panel that "the notion of 'interests' is not necessarily limited to actual or potential
economic advantage or detriment" 122 Although the parties did not contest the
legitimacy of the rights at issue here, the panel afforded similar breadth to the tern
"legitimate" as involving both a positivistic and normative perspective and "calling
for the protection of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that
underlie the protection of exclusive rights."12 3 Indeed, the panel expressly noted that
while one way of looking at legitimate interests-which it pursued in the particular
matter before it-was to consider the economic value of copyrights, this was
"incomplete and conservative" and the panel's focus on economic interests in the case
at hand was "not to say that legitimate interests are necessarily limited to this
economic value."'124
The central question in analyzing the third condition of the three step test,
however, was the level of prejudice that maybe considered unreasonable.125 Because
of the panel's focus on economic interests, the panel concluded that "prejudice to the
legitimate interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or
limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the
copyright owner." 126 The panel's cautionary language in focusing on economic
interests should, however, ensure that this formulation does not represent the limit of




120 See Id 6.223.
121 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 13.





127 Indeed, in a footnote, the panel sought interpretative assistance from commentary on the
meaning of article 9(2) of the Beme Convention, which reaffirms the willingness seen elsewhere
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In this context, however, it was sufficient to doom the business exemption. The
United States argued that the economic impact of the exemption could be determined
only by recognizing that many covered establishments would not in any event provide
licensing fees to the rights holders because they do not play music, "rely on music
from some source other than radio or TV (such as tapes, CDs, commercial
background music services, jukeboxes, or live music), "would take advantage of the
NLBA agreement if... the statutory exemption were not available," 128 or would
prefer to simply turn off the music rather than pay the fees demanded by the rights
holders. 129 The panel was unconvinced that these considerations reduce the economic
prejudice. 130 While some establishments might stop playing broadcast music if
required to pay a fee, other establishments that currently play recorded music may
decide to play music transmitted by broadcast or cable in order to avoid paying
licensing fees.131 Those that do not play any music at present may decide to do so,
given the free use permitted by the business exemption. 132 Moreover:
an exemption that makes the use of music from one source free of charge is likely to
affect, not only the number of establishments that opt for sources ofmusic that require
the payment of a licensing fee, but also the price for which the protected sources ofmusic
can be licensed. 133
This would heighten the economic prejudice suffered by right holders. 134 In light of
in the opinion to view copyright as something more than a trade issue. See IH 6.229 n.205.
128 The panel noted that "a private agreement constitutes a form of exercising exclusive rights
and is by no means determinative for assessing the compliance of an exemption provided for in
national law pursuant to international treaty obligations." Id 6250. Cf supra text accompanying
notes 106-111 (discussing reliance on licensing practices in determining the scope of permissible
exceptions).
129 Id. 6.238.




134 Again, the United States tried to place weight on the fact the business exemption applied
to many establishments from whom the CMOs received no license fees under the prior regime
because of lack of an effective or efficient enforcement structure. The panel stressed that both
actual and potential effects of the exception were relevant to the analysis under the third step of
article 13:
While under such circumstances the introduction of a new exception might not cause immediate
additional loss of income to the right holder, he or she could never build up expectations to earn
income from the exercise of the right in question. We believe that such an interpretation, if it
became the norm, could undermine the scope and binding effect of the minimum standards of
intellectual property rights protection embodied in the TRIPS Agreement.
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all this, the panel found the degree of prejudice unreasonable. 135
But again, the panel found the level of prejudice caused by the homestyle
exemption to be reasonable. 136 The same characteristics differentiated the business
exemption from the homestyle exemption: the different percentages of establishments
estimated to be covered by the exemption; the limitation to homestyle equipment; the
limitation (since 1998) to the public communication of transmissions embodying
dramatic renditions of dramatic musical works, upon which no licensing evidence
was submitted; and small establishments covered by the homestyle exemption have
never been a significant source of revenue collection for CMOs. 137
B. Analysis and lmplications
1. The Response of the United States
In July 2000, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rita Hayes informed the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body that the United States would not appeal the panel finding
that the business exemption violated TRIPS. 138 But this raises the question of what
the United States must do to bring itself into compliance with TRIPS. If it does not
do so, the United States may at the option of the EU139 be subject to trade sanctions
(or, if the parties agree, pay compensation to the EU). 140 Clearly, a repeal of the
Id. 6.247.
135 See Id. 6.265. This third condition threw up an argument that the EU had advanced
throughout its case, namely that the interests of right holders from all WTO countries (not just EU
countries) had to be considered in assessing the effect of Section 110(5) under article 13. From a
textual reading of article 13 the panel concluded that its assessment of whether the prejudice
caused by an exception is of an unreasonable level should not be limited to the right holders of the
complainant country. See Id. 6.23 1.
136 Id. 6.272.
13 7 Id. IN 6.270-6.271.
138 Panel decisions are appealable to a standing Appellate Body of the DSB. DSU, supra
note 2, at art. 17.
139 The sanctions that the EU wishes to impose would need to be approved bythe Dispute
Settlement Body. See DSU, supra note 2, arts. 21-22. It is likely that any sanctions approved by
the DSB would involve the suspension of obligations owed the United States under the TRIPS
Agreement, and thus would ironically harm the copyright industries that have already suffered
from the restriction of their rights in violation of international law. See European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU (Decision by the
Arbitrators, March 24,2000) (discussing the principle that suspension of obligations should occur
first with respect to the same sector and the same agreement in respect of which a violation was
found).
140 See DSU, supra note 2, arts. 21-22; see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 59, at 328-29
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business exemption, leaving the revised homestyle exemption in place, would ensure
compliance and obviate any such penalties. But the scope of the revised homestyle
exemption, as interpreted by the parties and the panel, is much narrower than the
original exemption.' 41 If the response of the United States to the panel decision is
simply to repeal subsection (B), the upshot of this battle of legislative and
international developments may be a contraction of section 110(5) rather than the
expansion sought by small business organizations. Thus, one possible legislative
response might be to repeal the 1998 amendments in toto and return to the original
homestyle exemption. It is not clear, however, that a simple return to the pre-1998
exemption would pass muster. The panel report occasionally supports the validity of
the homestyle exemption by reference to the pre-1998 case law and to the intended
scope of the original homestyle exemption. 142 At other times, however, the language
of the report makes clear that the amended exemption is the subject of analysis, 143 or
that the panel is relying on the reduced scope of application of the revised exemption.
An arbitrator appointed under article 21 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
has given the United States until July 27, 2001, to bring its law into compliance with
TRIPS, rejecting U.S. claims that it would take fifteen months (i.e., until October 27)
to complete the deliberation and legislative process necessary to ensure
implementation of the panel's ruling.144 The United States Trade Representative has
accordingly issued a Request for Comment, seeking input on the steps that the United
States should take in response to the panel ruling.145
While the nature of the legislative response in the United States will no doubt be
(discussing enforcement options).
141 See supra note 64.
142 In considering whether the homestyle exception was a "special case," the panel noted the
similar language in the original and revised versions of the exemption and commented that it
would "consider... the practice as reflected in the judgements rendered by U.S. courts after 1976
conceming the original homestyle exemption ... as factually indicative of the reach of the
homestyle exemption even after the 1998 Amendment."Id. 6.138.
143 See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.135. ("We examine now whether the homestyle
exemption in subparagraph (A), in theform in which it is currently inforce in the United States,
is a "certain special case" within the meaning of the first condition of article 13 of the TRIPS
Agreement") (emphasis added)).
144 See United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Arbitration Under Article
213(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Goveming the Settlement of Disputes, Doc.
No. WT/DS160/12 (Jan. 15,2001) [Arbitration Report]. The United States rested its claim for an
extended compliance period, among other things, on the domestic controversy likely to surround
any amending legislation. But the arbitrator, consistent with prior arbitration opinions, found
domestic controversy irrelevant to the time needed to ensure compliance with international
obligations. See Ia 41-42.
14 5 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Request for Comment on WTO
Dispute Settlement Proceeding Regarding Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 66 Fed. Reg.
8838 (Feb. 2,2001).
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very important for the owners of copyright in musical works, and for the owners of
bars, restaurants, and small businesses, the context of the debate regarding how to
respond is much more important The debate will unfold in the shadow of the panel
decision and under threat of trade sanctions. International copyright obligations, it is
now evident, are no longer cost-free. They are not to be lightly assumed because they
will not be enforced lightly. Tenuous arguments of compliance will be scrutinized not
just by copyright scholars, but by adjudicative panels with jurisdictional heft.
To be sure, the United States formally retains the sovereignty necessary to
maintain its existing copyright law. Thus, it is not only unclear how Congress will
act-it is still an open question whether it will act.146 While the decision not to appeal
the panel's conclusion was taken by the executive branch (and a prior administration
at that), the measures necessary for compliance cannot be implemented without the
involvement of the legislative branch. Yet, since the early stages of the legislation that
ultimately became the FIMLA, Congress has been more enthusiastic about the
expansion of the homestyle exemption than was the administration or the Copyright
Office (which, though strictly part of the legislative branch, reflected administration
thinking on the issue).147 Notwithstanding the changes in the nature of the public
international lawmaking process, international standards continue to be enforced on
the ground through the vehicle of national laws that may-or may not--be fully
compliant with those standards. 148 The potential imposition of trade sanctions,
however, makes the option of resistance far less likely or palatable.
2. Continuing Deference to National Autonomy
The mere existence of the panel report illustrates the transformed nature of
international copyright law. The balance between international standards and national
autonomy has been irrevocably altered. The report is the first authoritative finding of
a violation of international copyright law. And the United States stands to be
sanctioned ifit does not amend its law. However, that shift is one largely effected by
14 6 The United States has repeatedly indicated to WTO members that it intends to comply
with the panel report and make the necessary amendments to U.S. law. See Arbitration Report,
supra note 144, 1 (citing official communication from the United States).
147 See Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property ofthe House Comm on the Judiciay,
105th Cong. 16-19 (1997) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (discussing the
difference between the homestyle and business exemption); Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyights to William J. Hughes, Chair, House Subconm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration, Sept. 28, 1994, reprinted in 56 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPyRIGHT. J. (BNA) 741
(Oct. 15, 1998) (suggesting that legislation might precipitate a challenge under international law).
For a discussion of the development of the legislation, see generally Helfer, supra note 6.
148 See Ginsburg, supra note 98, at 2 (discussing the variables relevant to the creation of
supranational copyright standards).
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the TRIPS negotiators in 1994 when the TRIPS Agreement was made part of the
WTO dispute settlement system. The panel in United States-Section 110(5) did not
further recalibrate the balance.
Moreover, the outcome of the Section 110(5) dispute might create a slightly
misleading impression regarding the extent to which panels in later cases might defer
to national policy choices in enforcing international copyright law. The approach of
the panel speaks less radically to any transformation in this regard. The report
contains several passages apparently exhibiting substantial deference to national
autonomy. Indeed, in many respects, the panel's level of deference contains an echo
of pre-TRIPS attitudes to compliance. For example, in interpreting "certain special
cases" the panel resisted efforts by the EU to impose normative judgments about the
legitimate public policy purposes that each country could pursue.149 The panel
accepted the U.S. argument that it should "not impose any requirement as to the
legitimacy of the policy objectives that a particular country might consider special in
the light of its own history and national priorities." 150
The nature of the issue before the panel may have affected this disposition.
Although the scope of exceptions to copyright may become a significant issue in the
digital environment,1 51 the Berne Convention afforded countries generous scope to
create exceptions to copyright that promoted national attitudes to free speech or other
countervailing social policies. 152 Reflecting that latitude, state practice on exceptions
is so varied that national autonomy may pervade analysis of article 13 largely because
of the role of state practice as a source of law under the Vienna Convention. 153
Yet, it also needs to be emphasized that the panel's deferential pose sometimes
emanated from sources other than the traditional Berne-based philosophical
commitment to national autonomy. For example, in deciding not to require the United
States to defend the objective legitimacy of the purpose underlying the exceptions in
order to establish that the exception was a "special case," the panel's decision rested,
149 Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.112.
150
.1d. 6.106.
151 See Dinwoodie, supra note 9, at 516-18 (explaining that exceptions are likely to become
a contested issue because "[t]he predominant national approach to digital copyright issues
throughout the world has been to classify most acts by users as within the prima facie exclusive
control of the copyright owner, and then to create a proper balance by enacting exceptions and
limitations to that general principle").
152 See Sam Ricketson, The Boundaries of Copyright: Its Proper Limitations and
Exceptions: International Conventions and Treaties, 1999 INTalL PROP. Q. 56, 93 (1999) (noting
the flexibility given to national legislators by international treaty provisions on exceptions and
limitations).
153 See Shim Perlmutter, Future Directions in International Copyright, 16 CARDozo ARTS
&ENT. LJ. 369,370 (1998) (noting that "[m]ore variety exists in delineating theprecise scope of
rights through exceptions and limitations, although certain general categories are common'").
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in fact, upon a purely textual analysis of article 13.154 And review of the normative
basis for the exception, which the panel declined to conduct under the rubric of this
first step of the test, was part of the panel's analytical model for the other two steps
of the test.155 In short, the extent to which deference to national autonomy will be
endorsed by later panels remains somewhat unclear. 156
3. The Influence 9f the Trade Context in Copyright Law
The text of an agreement necessarily draws meaning from the context in which
it is developed and interpreted. The Berne Convention has, from the outset, been a
bridge between the common law copyright systems and the civil law droit d'auteur
systems.157 As such, deliberations regarding the content and revision of the
Convention benefited from exposure to a wide variety of views of copyright law and
its purposes and values. The incorporation of Berne into TRIPS and thus its
integration within the broader institutional infrastructure of the World Trade
Organization might thus imbue copyright questions with a trade hue.158 Yet copyright
law is about more than trade. It reflects values of personality and authorial integrity,
and a balance ofprivate rights and public access, that a trade equation might obscure.
Although the nature of the issue before the panel gives the report an economic focus,
it does contain some reassuring language in this regard. For example, in articulating
the meaning ofthe third step in the three step test, the panel suggested that confining
the notion of "legitimate interests" to the economic value of copyrights was
"incomplete and conservative," even though the dispute before it largely implicated
purely economic interests. 159
The panel's fullest exploration of the relationship between the Berne Convention
and the Berne Convention as incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement does not come
154 See Panel Report, at 6.111 ('"t is difficult to reconcile the wording of Article 13 with
the proposition that an exception or limitation must be justified in terms of a legitimate public
policy purpose in order to fulfill the first condition of the Article.").
155 See Id % 6.166, 6.224.
156 The extent to which Appellate Body opinions, let alone panel reports, will be treated as
persuasive by later panels remains unsettled, see Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare
Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Pat Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANS'LL. & Po L 1, 4 (1999), which
further confuses the question.
157 See Gillian Davies, The Convergence of Copyright and Authors' Rights-Reality or
Chimera?, 26 INT'L REV. INDus. PROP. & CoPYRIGlTL. 964,965 (1995) (noting that the Berne
Convention had "provided a bridge" between the systems of copyright found in common law
countries and the droit d'auteur systems of civil law countries).
158 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
159 See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.227.
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in the heart of the report.160 Although the bulk of the panel's opinion focuses on an
interpretation of article 13 of TRIPS, the EU had raised a preliminary argument that
would might have prevented the panel from reaching that question. The EU
suggested that article 13 applied only to new rights added by the TRIPS Agreement,
and that the United States couldjustify an exception to rights guaranteed by the Berne
Convention only under pre-existing provisions of the Bere Convention. 161 The panel
rejected that argument, but because the United States had responded to it in part with
the suggestion that article 13 merely clarified the scope of the minor exceptions
doctrine that previously existed under the Berne Convention,162 the panel addressed
the interaction between the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.
More particularly, the panel had to decide whether, and to what extent, the minor
exceptions doctrine of the Beme Convention applied when the Berne Convention was
incorporated into TRIPS. The minor exceptions doctrine163 had never even been
expressly incorporated into the text of the Beme Convention.164 The panel concluded,
however, that language in the General Reports of the Brussels revision conference
reflected an agreement among the Beme signatories within the meaning of article
160 Neil Netanel has helpfully phrased the dilemma as whether there is a difference between
"Berne qua Beme' and "Berne in TRIPS." He concludes that "state practice under Berne should
indeed be the fundamental starting point for interpreting Berne-in-TRIPS, although the Berne
provisions that are incorporated into TRIPS will necessarily be colored by TRIPS's state practice
and overall object and purpose as well." Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'LL. 441,447 (1997).
161 See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.34. The EU based this argument on article 20 of the
Berne Convention and article 2(2) of TRIPS, which prohibit Berne member countries from
entering into agreements that restrict rights granted by Berne. Id.
162 Id. 6.35.The panel agreed with the United States that article 13 is the applicable test for
determining the scope of permissible minor exceptions to Berne rights. Id. 6.81.
163 The parties also disagreed on the scope of the minor exceptions doctrine. The panel
rejected the argument that the doctrine should be restricted to non-commercial uses, relying in part
upon the wide variation in exemptions found in national laws and also upon the fact that some of
the illustrative uses mentioned by the different conference reports might not be non-commercial
in nature. The panel was thus willing to permit some exemptions of commercial use (and noted
that some non-commercial uses of works may in fact reach a level that has an impermissible major
economic impact on the right holder) provided that the exception contained in national law is
indeed minor. See Id 6.56-6.59. The panel noted that:
the [minor exceptions] doctrine is primarily concerned with de minimis use, but that otherwise its
application is not limited to the examples contained in the reports of the Berne Convention revision
conferences held in Brussels and Stockholm, to exclusively non-cornercial uses orto exceptions
in national legislation that existed prior to 1967.
Id. 6.93.
164 The Berne Convention does expressly refer to a variety of permissible exceptions. See,
e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 13, arts. 9(2), 10.
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31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention to permit exceptions in national law.165 State
practice under Beme confirmed the existence of the doctrine. 166
Article 9(1) of TRIPS incorporates the Berne Convention without express
reference to the minor exceptions doctrine, even if that doctrine was-as the panel
concluded-part of the Berne acquis. The panel concluded that if the incorporation
was only of the text of articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention, but not of the entire
Berne acquis relating to these articles, article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement would
have explicitly so provided.167 In grounding its incorporation of the entire Berne
acquis within the TRIPS Agreement on the lack of any suggestion to the contrary in
the text of TRIPS, the panel confirmed a general interpretive philosophy of broader
significance:
In the area of copyright, the Beme Convention and the TRIPS Agreement form the
overall framework for multilateral protection. Most WTO Members are also parties to
the Berne Convention. ... [I]t is a general principle of interpretation to adopt the
meaning that reconciles the texts of different treaties and avoids a conflict between them.
Accordingly, one should avoid interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to mean something
different than the Beme Convention except where this is explicitly provided for. This
principle is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts,
which has been applied by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in a nmnber of cases.168
Thus, the minor exceptions doctrine under Berne was now encapsulated in article
13 of TRIPS. More importantly, if this interpretive approach is applied by later panels
it should give some reassurance to those concerned that TRIPS interpretations may
strip Berne of other than trade-oriented values. 169
This willingness to consider the meaning of the Beme Convention, as it was
165 Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.53.
166 Id. 6.55. A variety of limitations can be found in different national laws from the time
of the Brussels revision to the present Id The panel declined to consider whether these examples
rose to the level of "subsequent practice" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention. See id. at n.68.
167 Id 6.62. In this regard, the panel pointed to the exclusion of article 6bis from the scope
of TRIPS. Id. at n.79.
168 Id. 6.66. The panel also supported its conclusion, which effectivelybrought the minor
exceptions doctrine within TRIPS, by noting references to the doctrine in the negotiating
documents of the Uruguay Round that led to TRIPS. See Id. 6.64. Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention provides that "[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting for the application of Article 31."
169 Similarly, the panel's willing reference to the later agreed WIPO Copyright Treaty-if
repeated in other contexts--will help to provide a dynamism by keeping the TRIPS Agreement
current, and also to ensure a broadening of any narrow trade perspective. See supra text
accompanying notes 190-96 (discussing relevance of the WIPO Copyright Treaty).
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understood in its own context, is evident throughout the report. Of course, it would
be hard to analyze article 13 of TRIPS without some regard for the Berne Convention
because article 13 has its genesis in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. Article 9(2)
had provided that countries could "permit the reproduction of... works in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the author. ' 170 This provision had applied only to the reproduction right under the
Berne Convention; article 13 of TRIPS elevated it to a general test of permissible
exceptions (including exceptions to performance rights). Thus, it is not wholly
surprising that when the panel analyzed article 13 it noted that its intent to ensure a
narrow or limited operation for the provision was reinforced by similar accepted
interpretations of article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.
But the panel departed from automatically transposing to article 13 every
accepted reading of article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, because of the different
scope of the two provisions. For example, in interpreting the first step of the three step
test, the panel declined to analogize the "special purpose" interpretation that had been
afforded the term "special cases" in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention to similar
language in article 13 of TRIPS. 171 Instead, the panel conducted a textual analysis of
article 13 to reach a different conclusion. 172 Indeed, as if to emphasize that the
incorporation of the agreement within TRIPS will have some effect on interpretative
approach, the panel supported its exegesis on this point by referring to interpretative
tests developed by the Appellate Body in other (non-intellectual property) WTO
contexts. 173 Indeed, throughout the report the panel periodically employed concepts
and approaches developed in past GATT and current WTO dispute settlement
practice.174
170 Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 9(2).
171 Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.111. Here, the panel departed from the explanation
provided bythe leading contemporary commentator on the Beme Convention. The panel indicated
a willingness generally, however, to consider "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations" as a subsidiary source for the determination of law. Id. 6.111 n. 114.
172 Id ("It is difficult to reconcile the wording of Article 13 with the proposition that an
exception or limitation must be justified in terms of a legitimate public policy purpose in order to
fulfill the first condition of the Article.").
173 Id ("[]n interpreting other WTO rules, such as the national treatment clauses of the
GATT and the GATS, the Appellate Body has rejected interpretative tests which were based on
the subjective aim or objective pursued by national legislation.).
174 See Id 6.185
We wish to express our caution in interpreting provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in light of
concepts that have been developed in GAIT dispute settlement practice.... [B]ut given that the
agreements covered by the WTO form a single, integrated legal system, we deem it appropriate to
develop interpretations ofthe legal protection conferred on intellectual property right holders under
the TRIPS Agreement which are not incompatible with the treatment conferred to products under
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4. Initiation of Claims
One of the ways in which the development of international copyright law through
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism might have caused a degree of trade-
centrism was the extent to which the initiation and conduct of proceedings would be
controlled by the trade representatives of respective governments. Parties before the
WTO are formally (and, indeed, exclusively) member states of the WTO, and thus
the initiation of complaints will be driven by national trade officials. This screening
process may alter the type of cases filed. But the selection of the types of cases to be
filed may also be affected by what the panels will require as evidence of allegedly
violative national law. Will a single decision of a trial court, for example, refusing to
offer protection in circumstances mandated by TRIPS, warrant panel disapprobation?
The panel in Section 110(5) looked at the practices of the "vast majority" of U.S.
courts as evidence of the meaning of the statutory provision. 175 The EU suggested
that prior to the 1998 amendment there was a trend in U.S. case law toward
broadening the homestyle exemption, and argued that the panel should consider this
trend. The panel declined to enter this debate and noted that WTO panels are not in
the business of predicting future developments in U.S. case law based upon previous
trends. 176 To do so, as the EU urged, would miscomprehend the nature of common
law lawmaking generally, and the fact-specific fine-tuning of balance that is the
hallmark of copyright law. It appears that the panel would await reasonable
development of approaches to issues in national systems before intruding. The panel's
caution should add legitimacy to the WTO project and restrict TRIPS violations to
circumstances where clearly adopted national positions reveal inadequate
protection.177
the GATT, or in respect of services and service suppliers under the GATS, in the light of pertinent
dispute settlement practice.
175 Id. 6.138-144.
176 The panel noted:
We cannot exclude the possibility that in the future U.S. courts could establish precedents that
would lead to the expansion of the scope of the currently applicable homestyle exemption as
regards covered establishment, but... [g]iven the sufficiently consistent and narrow application
practice of the homestyle exemption of 1976, we see no need to hypothesise whether at some point
in the future U.S. case law might lead to a de facto expansion of the homestyle exemption of 1998.
Id. 6.144.
177The United States made much of the fact that only three U.S. courts had found the
exemption applicable. This is somewhat misleading: once decisions are rendered, the collective
management organizations ceased enforcement proceedings against similar establishments, so the
relative paucity of decided cases is hardly powerful. Although the panel did not comment on this
aspect of the U.S. argument it did note later in the report that "in certain circumstances, current
licensing practices may not provide a sufficient guideline for assessing the potential impact of an
exception or limitation on normal exploitation ... [such as] where, due to lack of effective or
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5. Third Party Involvement
A further aspect of WTO proceedings that might undermine the claim of panels
to develop international copyright norms is the limited range of perspectives that
would be presented to them. Not only are appearances limited to governments, but
third countries can participate as a matter of right only where they have a substantial
trade interest in the dispute in question.178 But in Un ited States-Import Prohibition
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,179 the Appellate Body indicated a
willingness to accept amicus briefs and written submissions by interested persons
other than govemments. 180 The relaxed attitude that later WTO panels (following that
lead) have taken to third party submissions by nongovernmental organizations is also
seen in the Section 110(5) report. The panel was clearly ready to consider an
unsolicited letter from a law firm representing ASCAP, although the panel did not in
fact rely on the letter because it added nothing new to the debate. 181
The welcome amincus involvement of nongovernmental third parties in the
conduct of WTO proceedings arises, however, in the context of a broader debate
currently under way regarding the role of third parties in WTO proceedings. While
panels have liberalized the rules permitting involvement of third parties, including
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in dispute settlement proceedings, the
United States has insisted in recent months on excluding third party interested states
from its preliminary consultations (mandated by the WTO) with other states regarding
alleged GATT violations.182 This has led some to level the ironic complaint that
NGOs are being afforded greater access to the WTO system than member states.1 83
affordable means of enforcement, right holders may not find it worthwhile or practical to exercise
their rights."aId 6.188.
178 See DSU, supra note 2, art. 4.11 (role of third party member states in consultations); art.
10.2 (role of third member states in proceedings before the panel); 17.4 (permitting participation
of third party member states before the appellate body, but without a right of appeal to that body).
179 Report of Appellate Body, Doc. No. WT/DS58/AB/R, 110 (Oct. 12, 1998), available
athttp//wwvw.wto.org (interpreting article 13 of the DSU).
180 See generally Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent
Developments in International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizations a
Voice in the JPTO, 12 TRANS'L L. 427,434-44 (1999).
181 See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.8. The panel also made reference to submissions
made by third party member countries. See, e.g., % 6.55, 6.85.
182 This issue has arisen in connection with the challenge by the EU to the United States'
continuing use of trade retaliation procedures under the Trade Act The United States has adopted
a strict attitude to article 4.11 of the DSU, which permits third party involvement only by states
with a "substantial trade interest' in the issue. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 4.11.
183 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Make Unfriendly Noises on "Friends of the Court"
Dispute Briefs, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1283 (Aug. 17, 2000) (reporting June 7, 2000 and
July 27, 2000 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body).
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This issue brings the conceptual ambiguities of the WTO dispute settlement
procedures into sharp focus. Member states wishing to preserve remnants of the old
GATT system would like to restrict discussions to those governments involved, thus
reestablishing the former Metternichian character of GATT dispute settlements as
government to government diplomacy. Other states, such as the EU and the United
States, have argued for reform of the WTO procedures to make the dispute settlement
mechanism more transparent and more adjudicatory in nature. The disconnect
between liberal third party NGO involvement and restricted member state
participation has, however, forced some countries (such as Australia) to call for
guidelines on submission of briefs. 184 This should force countries to confront the
conceptual ambiguities of the system and permit the development of procedures that
ensure fair representation of a wide spectrum of countries and interests as panels
develop international copyright law.185
6. Injecting Dynamism into International Copyright Law
One of the criticisms leveled at the classical method of public international
lawmaking was its backward-looking nature.186 This prevented it from serving in the
vanguard of norm development. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism holds the
promise of making international copyright law more dynamic and more current
although, as noted above, there are costs to pursuing this potential too aggressively.187
To balance the gains of dynamic development with the possible costs of premature
and incorrect internationalization, panels will have to choose carefully the issues and
circumstances in which they will move beyond the strict text of the TRIPS
Agreement.
The Section 110(5) panel appeared to strike the right balance. As discussed
below, the panel sought carefully to link its report to the text of the TRIPS Agreement
and resisted the invitation of the EL to engage in activist predictions of future U.S.
case law.188 Yet several aspects of the panel's analysis of the minor exceptions
doctrine confirm the panel's determination to ensure that international copyright law
will not fossilize. For example, its refusal to treat the list of examples ofpermissible
184 See id.
185 See id. (predicting that the likely response is to liberalize the participation rights of
member countries rather than restricting the submission of amici briefs).
186 See Dinwoodie, supra note 9, at 490-94 (discussing the limits of the classical model of
public international copyright lawmaking).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
188 One might regard the panel's decision to analyze the business exemption's compliance
with the second and third steps of the article 13 test, notwithstanding its failure to satisfy the first
step, as more aggressive than typical in international adjudication. But given the interpretive
restraint otherwise shown by the panel, this is hardly a substantial criticism.
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exceptions in the reports ofpast revision conferences as exhaustive of the doctrine's
scope guaranteed some room for interpretation consistent with changing times and
technologies. Similarly, the rejection of the EU's argument that the coverage of that
doctrine was frozen in 1967, justifying only those limitations that were in force in the
national legislation prior to that year (when the Stockholm revision conference,
records of which described the doctrine as a means to allow countries to "maintain"
existing exceptions, was held), reflected a concern that international copyright law be
responsive to current conditions. And the panel's acknowledgment in interpreting the
first step of article 13 that the notion ofhomestyle equipment "may evolve as a result
of technological development" also reflects an unstated desire to ensure that
international copyright lawmaking does not entrench static rules that do not consider
the current technological environment 189
Finally, the panel's receptiveness to recent developments in other international
copyright fora will facilitate a more forward-looking institution. In support of its
interpretation of the legal status of the minor exceptions doctrine under the TRIPS
Agreement, the panel considered subsequent developments, and in particular the
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), which contains provisions similar to the three-step
test found in the Berne Convention and TRIPS. 190 The United States argued that the
Agreed Statement concerning article 10 of the WCT made clear that signatory
nations, including the EU, commonly recognized the minor exceptions doctrine to be
part of international copyright law. Although the panel recognized that the WCT
Agreed Statements did not constitute a subsequent treaty on the same subject-matter
within the meaning of article 30 of the Vienna Convention, subsequent agreements
on the interpretation of a treaty, or subsequent practice within the meaning of article
31(3) of the Vienna Convention, it did conclude that the Agreed Statement supported
the existence of the minor exceptions doctrine. The panel explained that:
We discussed the need to interpret the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement in
a way that reconciles the texts of these two treaties and avoids a conflict between them,
given that they form the overall framework for multilateral copyright protection. The
same principle should also apply to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and
the WCT. The WCI' is designed to be compatible with this fiamework, incorporating or
using much of the language of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement The
WCT was unanimously concluded at a diplomatic conference organized under the
auspices of WIPO in December 1996, one year after the WTO Agreement entered into
force, in which 127 countries participated. Most ofthese countries were also participants
189 See Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.145; see also Id. 6.187 (recognizing that "what is
a normal exploitation in the market place may evolve as a result of technological developments or
changing consumer preferences').
190 Article 10(1) of the WCT applied the standard for permissible exceptions set forth in
article 13 of TRIPS to the rights granted to authors under the WCT; Article 10(2) affirms the same
standard as applicable to rights granted under the Beme Convention. See WCT, supra note 47.
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in the TRIPS negotiations and are Members of the WTO. For these reasons, it is relevant
to seek contextual guidance also in the WCT when developing interpretations that avoid
conflicts within this overall framework, except where these treaties explicitly contain
different obligations. 19 1
It is probably uncontroversial to treat the WCT as at least relevant to an
interpretation of the Berne Convention; the WCT is, after all, a special agreement
under the Berne Convention.1 92 But article 1(1) of the WCT disclaims any
connection to any treaty other than the Berne Convention. 193 If the WCT, concluded
after the TRIPS Agreement, will be considered by panels (regardless of whether it is
fomally denominated as one of the relevant sources under the Vienna Convention),
then the Section 110(5) panel has laid the groundwork for a means of keeping the
TRIPS Agreement current 194 without amendment of TRIPS. 195 But, this interpretive
191 Panel Report, supra note 6, 6.70 (footnotes omitted).
192 See WCT, supra note 47, art. 1(1) ('his Treaty is a special agreement within the
meaning of Article 20 of the Berne Convention"); Beme Convention, supra note 13, art. 20
(authorizing Berne signatories to enter into special agreements among themselves, "in so far as
such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or
contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention").
193 See WCT, supra note 47, art. 1(1) ("This Treaty shall not have any connection with
treaties other than the Beme Convention, nor shall it prejudice any rights or obligations under any
other treaties."). The Agreed Statements include no corresponding disclaimer, and indeed include
references to their concordance with TRIPS. See, e.g., Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20,1996, Statements Conceming Articles 4,5, and 7. Neil Netanel argues
therefore that the Agreed Statements maybe relevant to the interpretation not only of the Beme
Convention, see Netanel, supra note 160, at 463-70, but also of TRIPS. See id at 473 (treating the
Agreed Statements as "subsequent agreements" relevant to TRIPS interpretation under article 31
ofthe Vienna Convention on Treaties). Placing weight upon this difference might, however, result
in the Agreed Statements being accorded more weight in interpretation than the WCT itself But
see id. (arguing that, even if the WCT cannot be considered a "subsequent agreement" regarding
TRIPS because of article 1(1), both the WCT and Agreed Statements will be directly relevant to
TRIPS interpretation as indications of subsequent state practice).
194 It would also permit the infusion of values not restricted to trade, because these other fora
are not as trade-dominated as is the WTO. The WCT was adopted at a diplomatic conference in
1996 organized under the auspices of WIPO. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at
WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'LL. 369 (1997) (discussing the conclusion of the WIPO Copyright Treaty).
195 Neil Netanel has argued that the WCT (and the accompanying Agreed Statements) may
constitute subsequent agreement and state practice under both Beme and TRIPS, and thus be
relevant to a WTO panel's interpretation of TRIPS. See Netanel, supra note 160, at 464-75. This
will, as Netanel concedes, depend upon a variety of considerations such as how many WTO
members adhere to the WCT and the practice of WCT parties in implementing those obligations.
Id. at 468. But Netanel's resort to the WCT in interpreting TRIPS is in part filtered through the
WCT's relevance to the interpretation of the Beme Convention. Id. at 469-75. If the WCT and
Agreed Statements were relevant to TRIPS interpretation only indirectly through the Berne
Convention, this would limit their relevance to Beme-derived provisions, and thus (Netanel
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device-which is surely activist in nature given the panel's Vienna Convention
analysis-would do so in a less worrisome way than activist interpretation of TRIPS
generally because the WCT was itself constrained by many of the traditional brakes
of public international copyright lawmaking. Although the WCT addressed new
issues not fully developed at the national level (such as protection against
circumvention of technological measures regulating copying or access), it was
adopted by consensus and only after a full and open airing before multilateral
international copyright policymaking bodies.1 96 And, the panel has, by stressing the
textual basis for its decision, by characterizing the WCT as merely subsidiary support
for its conclusion regarding TRIPS rather than as an independent source of law, and
by framing its forward-looking perspective as a reconciliation of the intent of the
TRIPS negotiating parties, injected some controlled dynamism without overstepping
the bounds of adjudicative conduct
7. Language and Results: Ensuring Legitimacy
The circumspect approach of the Section 110(5) panel closely resembles that
found in the first Appellate Body report on a TRIPS complaint (involving Indian
patent law).197 As in the United States-India Appellate Body report, the Section
110(5) panel was careful to link all of its reasoning to the agreed-upon text of the
TRIPS Agreement This was crucial in lending legitimacy to the decision finding
India in violation of TRIPS, 198 and the same is true in Section 110(5). Yet despite the
cautious interpretive approach signaled by both the panels and Appellate Body to
concedes) prevents their consideration in construing independent (albeit similar) provisions such
as article 13 of TRIPS. Id at 470-75. The panel here appears willing to look at the WCT directly,
a position also endorsed by Netanel before the initiation of the Section 110(5) complaint See id
at 473.
196 Concerns about transparency in the development of international norms have found
expression not only in critiques of WTO lawmaldng, but also in the context of WIPO's increased
use of soft law mechanisms, such as non-binding resolutions of the WIPO Assembly. See Joint
Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-known Marks, General Report of the
Assemblies of the Member States of WlPO, 34th Annual Meeting, Doc. A134/16 % 178 (Sept
1999) (noting the concerns expressed bythe Argentinian delegation "over the creation of de facto
norms without defining a mechanism that ensured permanent transparency of the negotiation and
decision-making processes, as well as a clear vision of the objectives").
197 See India--Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
Doe. No. WT/DS50/AB/R (WTO Appellate Body, Dec. 19, 1997) available at
http'.//www.wto.org/ [hereinafter United States-India].
198 Indian commentators viewed the Appellate Body decision in United States-India as much
preferable to the panel decision because they believe it adhered more closely to the TRIPS
Agreement that was negotiated. Jayashree Watal went so far as to say that the Appellate Body
decision 'restores some of the faith that we had lost in the WTO." The WTO Appellate Body: The
First Four Years, 2 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 425,432 (1999) (comments of Jayashree Watal).
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date, all four panel reports on TRIPS complaints have found some violation of
TRIPS.199 This may, however, be attributable to the early cases being brought,
namely relatively clear transgressions. In this, the member states appear (largely) to
be heeding the advice of commentators tendered soon after the conclusion of
TRIPS.200 Indeed, the extent of current restraint (at least in so far as formal
complaints are concerned) is graphically demonstrated by the decision of the United
States to concentrate on violation complaints in initiating proceedings for TRIPS
infractions, while taking the position that the moratorium on nonviolation complaints
instituted by article 64(2) of TRIPS has expired.201
This cautious approach is consistent with approaches historically used by
international adjudicatory institutions seeking to mediate the demands of effective
adjudication while providing reassurance to member countries regarding judicial
activism. Thus, panels of international institutions such as the European Court of
Human Rights are wont to announce that they have power to decide particular issues,
199 See Panel Report, supra note 6; Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
Doc. No. WT/DSl 14/R (WTO DSB Panel Report, Mar. 17, 2000), available at
httpl/Www.wto.org/; Canada--Term of Patent Protection, Doc. No. WTADSl70/R (WTO DSB
Panel, May 5, 2000), available at http'//www.wto.org, United States-India, supra note 197.
Panels have, however, also found that some counts in the complaints did not reveal violations of
TRIPS.
2 00 See Judith Bello, Some Practical Observations about WTO Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 37 VA. .INT'L L. 357, 358-59 (1997). One exception is the request which the
United States has made for consultations with Brazil regarding a long disputed point of
interpretation that is conceded by the United States to be a "narrow one." See Press Release, Office
of the United States Trade Representative, 2001 Special 301 Report (May 1, 2000), available at
www.ustr.gov/htm/special.html.
2 01 At the March 2000 TRIPS Council meeting, several countries suggested that the
moratorium should remain in effect until new provisions on the "scope and modalities" of
nonviolation complaints are agreed upon as contemplated bythe TRIPS Agreement. The United
States favored ending the moratorium, and took the position that the moratorium had automatically
expired on January 1, 2000. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 64. But the United States
indicated that it is not presently preparing to pursue non-violation cases. See Daniel Pruzin,
European Counties Call for Negotiations on Geographic Indications at Farm Talks, [Mar. 24,
2000] INT'L TRADE DAiLY (BNA), d4. The United States is showing less restraint in its annual
Special 301 review of foreign country intellectual property practices. In that context, the United
States Trade Representative has criticized several states that are in compliance with the clear
obligations of TRIPS, but which have proposed facially TRIPS-compliant laws that are
inconsistent with the United States' interpretation of optimal intellectual property rules. Press
Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President,
USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review (Apr. 30, 1999), available at
httpl/www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/04/99-41.html (discussing U.S. criticism of New Zealand's and
Australia's efforts to reform their copyright law to permit parallel importing, notwithstanding the
express refusal of TRIPS parties in article 6 to address that issue in the TRIPS Agreement).
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but reflrain from immediate exercise of that power.202 Alternatively, panels will make
decisions holding countries in violation of international standards, but do so only on
very narrow grounds. 20 3 Each device is an attempt to retain legitimacy while making
progressive developments in the international law. The WTO panels, including the
one that issued the report in Section 110(5), are thus operating within the mainstream
of international bodies struggling to achieve the gains ofjudicial lawmaking without
suffering the costs ofjudicial activism. It is a universal judicial struggle, although one
that is made more difficult in a context where the international institution is the object
of continuing legitimacy critiques.
111. THE RoLE OF PRiVATE LAW MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW
In recent years, national courts have been confronted with an increasing number
of copyright disputes among private parties involving international questions. This
is hardly surprising. The same reasons that have made international copyright norms
relevant to the legislative debate have generated private disputes implicating the often
conflicting interests of a number of nations. Cultural assimilation and the ability of
digitized works to evade national regulation make it significantly more likely that
modem copyright litigation will entail analysis of different national laws. Such
litigation will, however, rarely require direct attention to more than one (seemingly
paradoxical) principle of international copyright law: all copyright is local.
International copyright law merely operates as a system to connect disparate, if
increasingly harmonized, national laws. Adherent countries to the Berne Convention
undertook to accord national treatment to nationals of other Berne members, and
agreed that their copyright law would provide a basic level of copyright protection as
defined by the minimum standards set out in the Convention. The TRIPS Agreement
augmented these minimum standards, and backed up the obligations with an effective
enforcement mechanism. But TRIPS did not alter the basic premise, established in
1886, that private litigation would be resolved by the application of national law.a04
2 02 See Laurence R. Helfer,AdJudicating Copyright Claims under the TRlPSAgreement: The
Casefor a European Human RightsAnalogy, 39 HARV. J. IN'L. 357, 409-10 (1998) (discussing
the juisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights andnoting that the Courthas espoused
many of its forward-looking interpretations in cases in which the government ultimately prevailed
onlyto rely on such principles in subsequent cases to justif a ruling against national governments).
2 03 See i. (noting that "even when a petitioner prevails on the facts, the [European Court of
Human Rights] is careful to stress that governments are entitled to a measure of discretion, thereby
limiting the impact of its ruling and suggesting that national discretion may prevail in future
cases").
204 Within the EU, copyright hannonization has been effected through the use of directives.
To be effective, directives require aflirmative implementation in the laws of member states; they
are not directly applicable in the member states. See Treaty Establishing the European Community,
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Thus, while the public international lawmaking process has been substantially
reformed in recent years, the forces of internationalization have not yet fully filtered
down to the context of private litigation. But private litigation must still deal with
international disputes, which it does by localizing such disputes using traditional
private law techniques. The starting point for such a methodology is the presumption
of territoriality.20 5 The presumption infuses the philosophy and text of the Beme
Convention, and it similarly pervades copyright analysis in U.S. courts. A dispute will
be found to arise under the U.S. copyright laws, and thus to implicate the federal
question jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, only if it involves an act of infringement
alleged to have occurred in the United States.206
The U.S. courts have nevertheless derogated from this general proposition in
several ways. First, in some courts the mere authorization in the United States of
infringing conduct abroad will be treated as sufficient to implicate U.S. jurisdiction
and U.S. copyright law on the basis that authorization is itself actionable
infringement 207 Second, the U.S. courts have assumed jurisdiction over activity
abroad that contributes to infringement within the United States.20 8 Finally, the U.S.
courts have granted relief in respect of acts of overseas infringement where a
predicate act of infringement occurring within the United States enabled further
as amended by the Treaty on European Union, art. 249 ("A directive shall be binding, as to the
result to be achieved, ... but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and
methods."). In this regard, a directive parallels the Berne Convention as an instrument of
international copyright law in the United States. But certain provisions of directives maybe treated
as directly creating rights in member states under the doctrine of "direct effect." See generally
P.S.R.F. MATHuSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNnY LAW 150 (6th ed. 1995). This differs
from the parallel question with respect to international treaties, because EU law (and, ultimately,
an EU-level court, the European Court of Justice) will determine whether the directives have direct
effect while national laws determine whether international treaties are self-executing or otherwise
have direct effect in national law. See supra note 22 (discussing self-execution). As this distinction
highlights, EU law is a body of supranational law with more intrusive effect upon national
sovereignty than the Beme Convention or even TRIPS.
205 See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
206 See id.
207 See, e.g., Expediters Int'l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 995
F.Supp. 468,477-78 (D.NJ.1998); Curb v. MCA Records, Inc. 898 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Tenn.
1995). Courts are split on this question, however. See, eg., Subafilms, 24 F3d at 1095 (overruling
Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Cont'l Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986)); Fun-Damental
Too Ltd. v. Genimy Indus. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (following
Subafilms); Armstrong v. Virgin Records Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628,634 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting
repudiation of Peter Starr). The weight of authority probably favors the Subafilms position.
208 See, ag., Armstrong, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that jurisdiction
may exist over defendant's foreign acts to the extent that the defendants could be liable
contributorily or vicariously for subsequent infringement within the United States); Blue Ribbon
Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 454,461-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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inffingement abroad. 209
In each of these cases, the courts have almost reflexively applied U.S. law to the
dispute before then 210 But, strictly speaking, a localizing philosophy requires a
localizing rle. And thus there is a long-standing, and, until recently, rarely discussed,
copyright choice of law rule. Traditionally, and still typically, copyright disputes are
litigated in and under the laws of the country in which the act of infringement is
alleged to have occurred. This is taken by many courts and scholars to flow from
article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which provides that "the extent of protection,
as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed."21'1
Recently, U.S. courts have, however, paid more attention to choice of law in
copyright disputes. Most notably, in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian
Kurier, Inc., the Second Circuit found existing commentary unduly simplified and
thus developed a copyright choice of law rule as a matter of federal common law.2 12
The court concluded that different laws may apply to different issues in a copyright
litigation.2 13 In particular, the court determined the ownership of the copyright in
question by looking to the law of the place with the most significant relationship to
20 9 See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l Ltd., 149 F3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998)
(unauthorized transmission and copy of work made in the United States and then further
transmitted to Europe and Africa); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45,52 (2d
Cir. 1939) (awarding plaintiffprofits from both U.S. and Canadian exhibition of inflinging motion
picture where a copy of the motion picture had been made in the United States and then shipped
to Canada for exhibition), af'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
2 10 Courts applying this theory have not analyzed whether the acts abroad were infringing
under the foreign law in question. See, e.g., Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 52. But cf Filmvideo Releasing
Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981) (declining to enjoin foreign exhibition absent proof
that foreign copyright laws were infringed). Courts have, however, been insistent that the U.S.
activity trulybe a predicate for the foreign acts. See Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530
F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that noninfringingrehearsals in the United States were not
a predicate for unauthorized live performances in Canada); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061 (2d
Cir. 1988) (noting that unauthorized live performances of song in France did not flow from the act
of unauthorized reproduction in the United States).
211 See Beme Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(2). Textually, article 5(2) could be read to
institute a rule of lexfori because the forum is "the country where protection is claimed" But the
accepted reading of the provision is that it refers to the country in respect of which protection is
claimed, that is, where infringemet is alleged to have occurred. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin,
Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright Infringement
Litigation, 23 CoLum.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 1, 24-25 (1999).
212 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
2 13 The court thus recognized the doctrine ofdepepage, which permits courts to applythe law
of one state to one issue in a litigation before it and the law of another state to a separate issue in
the same litigation. Id. at 88-92. It thus recasts the choice of law exercise as an effort to select the
law applicable to decide an issue rather than a case. See Willis L.M. Reese, Depegage: A Common
Phenomenon in Choice ofLaw, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58,58 (1973).
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the parties and the transaction.214 This test, reflecting the influence of the Second
Restatement of Conflicts, persuaded the court to give most weight to the nationality
of the authors, and the place of first publication, both of which were Russian. But, on
the separate question of which law applied to determine questions of "infingement,"
the court concluded that the lex loci delicti would apply.215 This led the court to apply
U.S. law to the question of infringement, notwithstanding that Russian law had
applied to determine the ownership of the copyright in question 216
But nationality and place of publication may say little about the respective
prescriptive claims of interested states in a more complex global economy. And the
rule of lex loci delicti may provide too many loci delicti in a digital world where, for
example, publication may occur simultaneously in a number of countries. Indeed,
under prevailing copyright doctrine, these places can easily be interpreted, in most
cases, to include the United States if the digital copy is accessible by persons in the
United States. 217
Thus, conventional choice of law doctrine used in private international copyright
litigation is problematic on its own terms. And, by insisting upon localization of a
multinational dispute within a single territory, traditional private law techniques
forswear the ability to contribute to international norm development by fictionalizing
international disputes as national in nature. If, instead, courts addressed international
disputes in real terms that accounted for the international nature of the dispute, rather
than through the fiction of localization, they could contribute to the development of
international copyright norms.
This contribution could be facilitated by adopting a new approach to choice of
law in international copyright cases. In particular, a court faced with an international
copyright dispute might not necessarily apply the copyright law of a single state to the
contested issues, but instead formulate a rule reflecting the varied national and
international interests of the dispute before it.2 18 This approach finds conceptual
2 14 Itar-Tass Russian News Agency, 153 F.3d at 90.
2 15 The court would have reached this conclusion whetherthrough application of afixedrule
(akin to the First Restatement) or as a result of a broader interest analysis (more similar to the
Second Restatement). Id. at 91.
216 For a recent discussion of the Itar-Tass opinion, see William F. Patry, Choice ofLaw and
International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383 (2000).
2 17 See Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir.
1995) (performance occurs at place or receipt of satellite transmission); National Football League
v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831, 1834-35 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that
where defendants originated the streaming of copyrighted programming over the internet from a
website in Canada, public performances occurred in the United States because users in the United
States could access the website and receive and view the defendants' streaming of the copyrighted
material).
2 18 See Dinwoodie, supranote 9, at 552-69 (discussing the application of such an approach).
To the extent that courts drew from public international sources, such as the Berne Convention,
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antecedents in a variety of historical settings, and falls within what is called the
substantive law method of choice of law.219
This substantive law approach can be supported as a matter of conflicts theory,
it extends the critique of the fomalistic claim that choice of law involves selecting
between competing jurisdictions;220 it recognizes that national legislatures rarely
enact laws with an eye to international disputes; and it maps applicable legal rules to
the variety of national and international norms that citizens increasingly take to
govern their lives. But, for the purpose of this article, the biggest advantages are with
respect to what this approach might contribute to the internationalization of copyright
law. Using the substantive law method to develop international norms takes
advantages of the power of litigation. Like activist WTO adjudication, using domestic
litigation to generate international norms more easily permits attention to issues raised
by new technology, and can thus supply the dynamism missing from classical public
international lawmaking.
However, the substantive law method will achieve this benefit without incurring
the costs associated with broad WTO lawmaking. In particular, parties bringing
private disputes to courts are likely to reflect much greater diversity than those having
input into the conduct of WTO dispute settlement proceedings (even allowing for the
evolving liberal approach by panels to third party involvement). Persons having input
to the development of international norms would reflect a more varied set of interests.
States would remain free to deviate from multinational standards developed by other
countries' courts. Thus, although reference to the practices of other national courts
devising international solutions would be encouraged, the facultative nature of this
reference would encourage the national experimentation that activist WTO
adjudication would threaten. Any harmonization that this approach engendered would
be based upon the force of reason, rather than in response to the threat of trade
sanctions. A national court decision articulating international standards is more
readily subject to legislative reversal, and would thus be more closely linked to the
democratic process than is the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. These
advantages illustrate the claim ofprivate international lawmaking to an important role
in the development of international copyright norms.
the TRIPS Agreement, or WTO panel reports, in formulating such rles they would ensure more
direct effectiveness ofpublic international copyright law. Cf Ginsburg, supra note 98, at 2 (noting
that the impact of the Section 110(5) opinion may depend in part on the "willingness of national
courts to looks to the WTO panel decisions for guidance in evaluating local exceptions").
2 19 For a discussion of the leading historical schools of choice of law thought, see Symeon
Symeonides, General Report, in SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWATTHE
END OFTHE TwENTmEH CENuRY: PROGRESS OR REGRES 9-21 (2000) (describing the schools of
multilateralism, unilateralism, and substantivism). For a fuller explication of the antecedents, see
Dinwoodie, supra note 9, at 543-45.
2 20 See David F. Cavers, A Critique ofthe Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173,
189 (1933).
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CONCLUSION
International copyright law has clearly been transformed as a result of the
availability of WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Indeed, developments in the
WTO are emblematic of broader changes in the international copyright lawmaking
process. International copyright law institutions are reacting to the demands of
constant change in seeking to establish lawmaking mechanisms which are dynamic
in nature. There are good reasons to support this development Copyright law must
keep current with the technological and cultural growth that it engenders. But it must
also keep faith with the notion of cultural diversity that underlies both domestic and
international principles. To do so, countries (especially developed countries) must
resist the temptation to seek dynamic lawmaking from WTO panels. The gains may
be high, but so are the costs. Instead, private international litigation, if reconfigured
to reduce application of purely national norms, might make a beneficial contribution
to internationalization in ways that are dynamic, more balanced, and more respectful
of national difference.
